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Constructing a New Nationalism from Below: 
The Dalit Movement, Politics and Transnational Networking  
 
Lisa A. Daily 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
 
 This research examines one potential route for sub-national social movements to 
alter preexisting contemporary nationalisms- the transnational social movement network.  
When social movements “go global” they move beyond the nation where they are 
typically excluded from the national project and instead, become members of an 
alternative and inclusive transnational project.  What social movements do at this level is 
not under examination here, but rather how they go about returning to their respective 
nations and challenging the hegemonic national project.  Does the transnational site 
impact the success of sub-national social movements?  Is a movement more likely to 
achieve its goals and experience inclusion into the national identity due to transnational 
networking?  One key assumption of this research is that on a global and national level 
there exist projects which seek to include some citizens or groups while excluding others.  
These divisions are paralleled to racial divides according to Anthony Marx (1998).   
 The Dalit movement in India serves as an exploratory case study due to its sub-
national roots and transnational mobilization, and the racialized and exclusionary 
  vi   
practices of the caste structure.  Dalits, previously known as “Untouchables,” are 
relegated to the lowest position below the caste hierarchy where they witness 
discrimination primarily through violence and a lack of access to resources.  The 
movement has gone global, but then returned to India where it seeks to hold states 
accountable.  It has also sought inclusion through political means, forming its own 
political party-the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP)-in 1984.   
 This research traces the global route of one Dalit movement organization, the 
National Campaign on Dalit Human Rights (NCDHR), but then tests the success of Dalit 
inclusion by examining one internal indicator-the electoral results of the Bahujan Samaj 
Party.  The electoral results where taken from a pre-global (1995-1999) and a post-global 
(2002-2009) period.  Findings demonstrate that over time the BSP has significantly 
increased its participation in elections and slightly increased its success-rate at achieving 
elected positions.  While the Dalit movement continues to experience some degree of 
success at both the national and state levels, they have not yet been fully integrated into 
India’s national project.   
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Chapter One 
 
    Introduction and Organization  
 
 
  
 The manner in which nationalism is influencing nation-states and elites is 
changing in an era of globalization.  Scholars are, thus, responding to claims about 
nationalism and globalization by re-examining the meaning and status of nationalism.  
Some scholars argue that nationalism is becoming irrelevant while others suggest its 
importance has increased.  There, most certainly, is not a consensus on the current state of 
nationalism with the exception of the broad opinion that something is changing (Delanty 
2008; Archer et al. 2007; Hearn 2006; Kaldor 2004; Kennedy 2001; Newman 2000).  On 
a large scale, this project address the lack of consensus by suggesting an alternative- the 
need for an analysis of post-modern nationalism as seen from below, to examine if the 
changes in nationalism may be affected by the masses, particularly sub-national social 
movements.      
 The exclusive nature of many national projects may, in turn, shape those very 
people who are excluded into an alternative inclusive community-one which then 
contests its own exclusion from the nation.  One possible alternative inclusive community 
is beyond the local or national level, but rather may be found at the global level of 
transnational social movement networks.  These networks act as sites of global 
inclusivity, gathering people from around the world who share grievances.  Yet, as Ruth 
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Retain (2007) points out, going global is most effective when those social movements 
which left the nation for the global then return to the nation to seek change from within.   
 The exclusion of certain people and citizens from the central nation-whether 
through ideology, religion, or access to resources such as education and the market- 
demonstrates most concretely why certain groups rise up to challenge and change aspects 
of their nations, states, and/or communities.  Nationalism is most often thought of as a 
top-down creation; by below, I reference citizens and non-governmental organizations 
which are not considered elite or associated with the government.  The possible 
increasing success and recognition of sub-national movements, as noted in scholarly 
literature, which participate in the transnational social movement network hint at changes 
and challenges to previously established nationalisms as well as policies, traditions and 
cultural norms.  
 Similar to the contemporary debate over nationalism and globalization, the very 
definition of nationalism is incongruous.  For the purposes of this paper, I recognize 
nationalism as an ideology defined by both Anthony Smith and Benedict Anderson.  
Anthony D. Smith (1998) defines nationalism as: “an ideological movement for attaining 
and maintaining autonomy, unity and identity for a human population deemed by some of 
its members to constitute an actual or potential 'nation'” (256).  Smith asserts that 
nationalism is, “the most ubiquitous and enduring phenomenon in the modern world, the 
ideological movement and symbolic structure with the greatest staying power, one that 
always appears, as it were, to be waiting in the wings for its opportunity to emerge, in the 
chaos of conflict and disintegration that attends the fall of states and empires” (258).   
Smith understands Benedict Anderson's (1991) perspective on nation and nationalism as 
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an “imagined community.”    
 Anderson defines nation as “an imagined political community and imagined as 
both inherently limited and sovereign” (6).  He considers it imagined because “the 
members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet 
them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion” 
(6).  Anderson's definition is comparable to Hobsbawm's (1990), who calls nationalism 
an “invented tradition.”  These definitions point out the social construction of nationalism 
as opposed to some sort of naturally-occurring national collective identity.   
In its creation, as historically done by states and elites, people are either included 
or excluded, often among racial divides (Marx 1998).  These excluded groups and their 
potential for affecting changes to previously established nationalisms are what will be 
studied in this research project.   
 The Dalit movement of India, based around Dalit rights for equality and inclusion, 
serve as a case study for this project.  Dalits (“broken people”) are formerly known as 
“untouchables,” and the lowest members of the “backward castes” within the Hindu caste 
system.   They are a group of people who have historically been denied participation in 
India's national identity and access to vital resources such as water, food, housing, 
education, and the economy.  Modern India has between 160 million and 170 million 
Dalits out of its total population of about 1,147,995,904 (2008 census).  Today Dalits 
directly challenge the discriminatory practices embedded in India's structure often relying 
on previously unenforced Indian law.  The Indian Constitution of 1950 declares casteism 
as wrong; this was later reinforced with the 1989 Prevention of Atrocities Act.   
 Dalit exclusion is demonstrated in the statements and literature of the movement, 
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its goals and actions, large-scale human rights organizations, and previous scholarly 
research.  There is currently, however, no work looking at the potential influence of sub-
national movements which go “global” to transnational social movements and their 
impact on nationalism.   The Dalit movement has followed this path from the local to the 
national and then to the global, but has remained rooted in the need for change within the 
nation and state.  Some research has been done on the Dalit movement as it goes global, 
but few scholars have sought to see what then happens when Dalits return to the nation in 
order to challenge their own inclusion.  For this reason, it seems necessary for an 
exploratory case study analysis.   
 There is not as yet a direct causal relationship between social movements, 
globalization and nationalism.  For instance, it is possible that other sub-national 
movements which do not go global also impact a given national project.  This project is 
not arguing that changes in nationalism are only due to global activism among social 
movements.  It is merely one avenue in need of exploration when seeking an 
understanding of the current status of nationalism and its potential for change from 
below.    
 Therefore, I ask are sub-national social movements who “go global” by 
participating in the transnational social movement network successful at then returning to 
their nation and effectively challenging the previously understood national identity?  Are 
they more successful than prior to “going global”?  The purpose of my research project 
on the Dalit case is threefold.  I examine if, in fact, the movement is challenging 
nationalism, if it is successful, and if it is more likely to be successful due to the 
processes of globalization.  Globalization is operationalized through only one aspect-the 
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transnational social movement network, particularly movement participation in the 2001 
UN World Conference against Racism (WCAR) held in Durban, South Africa and the 
World Social Forum since 2001.   
 I hypothesize that contemporary sub-national social movements are more likely to 
experience success at either challenging their own exclusion or in achieving an increased 
level of national inclusivity after participating in the transnational social movement 
network.  This is in comparison to movement success prior to going global.  I test this 
hypothesis by conducting a comparison of pre- and post- transnational social movement 
participation in the Dalit movement case.  Measures of success rely on two crucial 
indicators- one which monitors the internal national and state-based success of the 
movement and one which follows the movement to the transnational public sphere.  
These indicators provide insight into the Dalit movement presence at both the global and 
the local levels.     
 Internal success is analyzed through electoral results of the Dalit-based political 
party, the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP), in comparison to the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya 
Janata Party.  Although the BSP is a political party, it has emerged from the Dalit 
movement and remains connected through affiliations, shared goals, grievances, and a 
collective identity.  The success of the external indicator of transnational networking is 
not under review here.  Sufficient scholarship and movement data provide adequate 
support that this has indeed been beneficial to the movement.  Instead, this thesis studies 
the internal indicator both prior to and after the movement went global.  
 Transnational forums, such as the World Social Forum (WSF) and the UN World 
Conference Against Racism (WCAR) act as sites for alternative collective identities, 
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networking, collaboration and also, negotiation and contention among its participants.  
These forums consist mostly of sub-national movements made up of groups which are 
excluded from their national policy, politics, and identity.  These groups “go global” to 
the transnational level, but then as Ruth Reitan (2007) in Global Activism notes, they 
return to the local and national level to affect change.   
     Theoretical Framework 
 Several theoretical frameworks provide an understanding of the reflexive 
relationships among nationalism, globalization from below and social movements.  
Antonio Gramsci's theory of cultural hegemony grounds this research in order to reiterate  
how a dominant discourse is used to subvert other, less powerful or mainstream ideas, 
beliefs, and identities.  Nationalism prevails as the hegemonic whereas excluded groups 
are subverted.  Yet, if these subversive, excluded groups gain recognition and support 
they may quickly get appropriated into the hegemonic.  This is why they may be 
successful at altering nationalism.  The Bahujan Samaj Party is officially recognized as a 
national political party in India and risks this very appropriation opting for political 
power instead of activism.   
 Gramsci highlights a vital aspect of the social interactions which exist in this case 
study.  A central concern for social movements, whether sub-national or transnational, is a 
battle not only over ideology, politics and culture, but the power to effectively enforce or 
change the status quo.  Power can be enacted through forceful rule as Max Weber 
believes or through the subtle acts of hegemony.  Although violence is often involved in 
imposing the caste-ranking and position of the Dalits, it has most effectively been 
ingrained in the citizens of India very slowly over time through religion and then 
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colonization.   
 Regarding the Dalit movement, Gramsci's theory predicts that as the movement 
grows and the Dalit-based party, the Bahujan Samaj Party, increases in popularity the 
movement risks appropriation and the loss of authenticity.  Nicolas Jaoul's (2007) 
“Political and 'Non-Political' Means in the Dalit Movement,” is particularly concerned 
with this risk calling the attainment of political power “a potential trap for an authentic 
people's movement” (191).  In part, this concern is subverted by the Dalit movement's 
refusal to become a part of the contemporary Bahujan Samaj Party.   Rather, it opts to 
unofficially support the party and only officially support BSP candidates as they run for 
office.  
 Gramsci heavily influences Althusser (1970) who distinguishes between 
repressive state apparatuses and ideological state apparatuses and points out the 
seemingly naturalness of ideology, as is the case with nationalism.  This theory supports 
claims in social movement analysis about center and periphery (Vanden 2004).  The Dalit 
movement is most certainly on the ideological periphery of Indian values and norms.       
 Mark Rupert (2003), in “Globalising common sense: a Marxian-Gramscian  
(re-)vision of the politics of governance/resistance,” suggests that a Marxian-Gramscian 
interpretation is needed when studying globalization and modern international relations.  
He writes, “Gramsci’s rich if eternally inchoate legacy suggests a conceptual vocabulary 
for a transformative politics in which a variety of anticapitalist movements might 
coalesce in order to produce any number of future possible worlds whose very possibility 
is occluded by capitalism” (181).  He is referencing the World Social Forum’s motto of 
“another world is possible.”  More directly, Harry E. Vanden (2007), in “Social 
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Movements, Hegemony, and New Forms of Resistance,” studies social movements in 
Latin America and considers whether or not they are “coming together in a new cycle of 
subaltern actions that can break down the hegemony historically exercised” (17).  Other 
scholars (Lash 2007), however, argue that alternative concepts need to be produced 
because “power now...is largely post-hegemonic” (55).  Yet, this claim comes with 
additional contestation from another scholar (Johnson 2007) in “Post-Hegemony?: I 
Don't Think So.”  The current debate about the relevance of Gramsci's hegemony is not 
of central concern for this thesis.       
 Rather, Gramsci's theory is examined by first tracing what the hegemonic and 
subversive entail in the case study of the Dalit movement.  As already mentioned, the 
Dalit movement and even the Dalit-based Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) are the subversive 
group while Hindu nationalism and the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) are clearly the 
hegemonic.  This project does not test what the hegemonic in India is but rather, provides 
an account of what it looks like, does and believes as a way to effectively demonstrate 
what the Dalit movement struggles against and seeks to change.     
 Other important ideas and theories regarding nationalism, social movements, and 
globalization are analyzed in an interdisciplinary literature review that follows this 
chapter.  Specifically, Anthony Marx (1998) in, Making Race and Nation: A Comparison 
of South Africa, The United States, and Brazil, notes the importance of inclusion and 
exclusion in national projects and how it is most often constructed around race.  It is 
inevitable and yet, those who are excluded are often more likely to collectively identify 
and put forth a movement to not only change policy but change the social construction of 
who is excluded and who is not.  Marx writes, “state-imposed exclusion of a specified 
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internal group, used to reinforce the allegiance and unity of a core constituency, may be a 
more pervasive pattern” and that “indeed, nation-states have often been based on such 
exclusion, not only according to race, but also ethnicity, class, and other cleavages” (25).    
 Lastly, an understanding of space, both the global and local, is necessary.  Bullen 
and Whitehead (2005) declare that the “changing spatial emphasis has in turn exposed a 
whole range of citizens and modes of radical/alternative citizenship forged around issues 
of gender, sexuality, ethnicity, age, class and religion, which had previously been 
excluded” (500).  Globalization scholarship currently examines this “changing spatial 
emphasis” and how space may be loosing its connection to place.  Lauren Langman 
(2001) refers to the “compression of space, time and distance associated with 
globalization” (196).  The Dalit movement goes beyond the place of the nation to a 
transnational space as a way to develop inclusive networks which better prepare them to 
return to the nation and witness increased inclusion.   
    Research Methodology  
The Dalit movement in India serves as an exploratory case study to determine 
whether or not there is sufficient evidence to support the assumptions and hypothesis of 
this project.  Robert K. Yin  (2003) states, “the case study is preferred in examining 
contemporary events, but when relevant behaviors cannot be manipulated” (7).  For this 
research to be possible large concepts, such as nationalism, have been restricted.  For 
instance, although nationalism and its changes may be monitored through cultural media 
this research only focuses on nationalism as a political entity.  
I look at what hegemony looks like in India and then the alternative projection by 
the Dalit movement as seen in Bahujan Samaj Party election results.  Is contemporary 
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Indian nationalism remaining static, moving closer to the movement's vision, or shifting 
to a renewed assertion of traditional values as Smith (1999) argues?     
Regarding the effectiveness of transnational social movement participation by 
sub-national social movements, I try to answer what is accomplished by going global, 
what strategies and networking tools are gained, what international attention the social 
movement's cause receives, and how the movement reflects all of this in its literature and 
action.   
By analyzing a social movement both before it went global and after and then 
charting any political changes pertaining to it or the excluded groups it represents, I may 
have enough information to support my hypothesis and generate suggestions for future 
research.   I will focus on political success as witnessed by the inclusion of excluded 
groups into the political sphere.  Since nationalism is a dynamic construction, there will 
most likely not be a clear method for determining the link between the politics and the 
national ideology.  For instance, policy in India already dictates equality among its 
citizens.  However, these laws are not enforced nor are they a part of the national identity 
and ideology.  Yet, “elections matter to a very large sector of Indians.  It is a matter of life 
and death to them...and despite all apparitions the elections do reflect the choices of the 
people” (interview with Professor Ashistani on NPR’s Morning Edition (April 15, 2009).     
  Because “success” can be examined in a variety of ways, I focus on political and 
policy-oriented success.  William Gamson's model for analyzing success (1990) is 
recognized although it has not proven very helpful in actually determining movement 
“success.”  Gamson (1990) provides a sociological perspective on how to go about 
measuring success and defining a “challenge period.”  If it were not for the reliance on 
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political party results, Gamson’s model may be more useful here.  According to Gamson 
(1990: 30-1), success is achieved when the “challenging group ceases to exist as a formal 
entity,” when it either dissolves or stops actively mobilizing, or lastly, when it is accepted 
by its “major antagonists…as a valid spokesman.”   
For this case study, Gamson’s last point is most relevant.  The Dalit movement 
and several of its ever-expanding organizations are internationally recognized and 
supported.  Yet, the movement has still not “achieved success”; perhaps it has achieved 
some success, but as a whole it still deals with many inequalities, injustices and forms of 
exclusion on local, state, national and global level.   There is a disconnect between the 
organizations of the movement and even a political party as valid spokesman and what 
the lived reality of (mostly rural) Dalits is like.    
  Ruth Reitan(2007), in Global Activism, draws connections between the sub-
national (local) and transnational (global) levels of social movements and  demonstrates 
the reflexivity between the two levels.  Her model begins with “localized action” against 
“trigger events” of neoliberal policy.   After localized action is initiated the next phase for 
a movement is in the realization of the need to go global.  Once this has been achieved, 
frames and claims tend to shift, bringing about heightened solidarity among the 
movement and other movements with similar grievances.  Solidarity is fully actualized 
when movements have “coordinated transnational action.”  But, Reitan then notes the 
importance of those movements to return to localized action where their actions will have 
a larger impact.  This process of starting local, going global, and then returning to the 
local is exactly what is traced with the Dalit movement.  As stated earlier, the argument 
for this route is not viewed as the only possible answer to why nationalism is changing.  
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Alternatively, this is viewed as one conceivable avenue that needs to be further explored.   
 In the case of India, I examine the dominant Hindu nationalism against the 
challenging Dalit movement.  My hypothesis is operationalized and tested by examining 
the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP), the Dalit-based political party.  I also, however, monitor 
the results of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), the Hindu nationalist party.  This is the 
clearest manifestation between the traditional Indian nationalism as opposed to the Dalit 
movement's new vision for the Indian nation and identity.  Electoral data on both the BSP 
and BJP are gathered on a state-by-state basis for two key periods: pre-global movement 
activity (1995-1999) and post-global movement activity (2002-2009).  The “moment” of 
going global for the Dalit movement is between 2000 and 2001.  This is the most 
recognized period of transnational activism as the movement participated in two 
legitimate and established forums- the 2001 UN World Conference Against Racism held 
in Durban and the 2001 World Social Forum held in Porto Alegre.   
 Election results come from the Election Commission of India (www.eci.gov.in) 
and are compiled from India's 28 states.  For a variety of reasons, however, only 16 of 
these states have sufficient data to analyze.  These results, however, alone are not 
necessarily enough to claim that the movement and the BSP are successful.  Other 
statistics have also been gathered to provide a broader perspective of Indian nationalism, 
the plight of excluded groups, and the actions of social movements.   When surveyed 
with various other facets, such as relevant scholarship and research, news coverage, and 
analysis of movement websites, it seems plausible to assert that the BSP and the Dalit 
movement are progressing very slowly.     
 The collected data includes: the election year, BJP contesting seats, BJP wins, 
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BSP contesting seats, BSP wins, total seats, and the overall winning party.  Once the data 
are compiled from multiple elections per state in the form of a spreadsheet, a comparison 
can be done between the pre and post-global periods and monitor changes that are 
occurring with the BSP and BJP.    Even small changes in the Bahujan Samaj Party 
electoral results warrant a notable shift either in favor of or potentially against the Dalit 
cause.   
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     Chapter Two 
 
            Literature Review  
 
  
 
 Since many of the terms in this paper stem from scholarly debates, contestations 
and negotiations, it seems necessary to define key concepts which, in turn, place my own 
perspective within (or against) the framework of previous theorists.  I will clearly define 
terms such as: nation, nationalism, the state, and globalization.  I'd also like to clarify an 
understanding of social movements, nationalism, the transnational social movement 
network, and lastly, how race impacts inclusion or exclusion.    
 Nationalism is recognized as an ideology as defined by both Anthony Smith and 
Benedict Anderson.   All social movements are not considered a threat to nationalism, but 
instead some are seen as attempting to change the ideology of a particular constructed 
nationalism.  Like revolution, certain social movements are trying to change what it 
means to be included or excluded from a national project and identity.  Nick Crossley 
(2002), in Making Sense of Social Movements, examines social movement theory and 
practice, stressing the importance of contestation as a strategy for change. Furthermore, 
he writes:  
social movements are in effect, natural experiments in power, legitimation 
and democracy.  Their existence, successes, failures and more generally 
their dynamics, though all incredibly difficult to read and interpret, allow 
us to gauge the workings of the broader political structures of our society” 
(9).   
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 Crossley establishes the value (and difficulty) in analyzing social movements as a 
broader way to examine a society's struggle over power, structures and identity. 
 Anthony Marx (1998) in, Making Race and Nation: A Comparison of South 
Africa, The United States, and Brazil, notes the importance of inclusion and exclusion in 
national projects.  It is inevitable and yet, those who are excluded are often more likely to 
collectively identify and put forth a movement to not only change policy but change the 
social construction of who is excluded and who is not.  Marx writes, “state-imposed 
exclusion of a specified internal group, used to reinforce the allegiance and unity of a 
core constituency, may be a more pervasive pattern” and that “indeed, nation-states have 
often been based on such exclusion, not only according to race, but also ethnicity, class, 
and other cleavages” (25).  Marx provides insight into the exclusion of some by the 
nation-state and national projects by declaring that states make race and not the other 
way around.  Race is used as a way to determine inclusion and exclusion as mandated by 
elites; it is applicable to this study as caste discrimination is, at least in part, a form of 
racial discrimination.  In the case of discrimination against Dalits there is a clear urban-
rural divide and a state-by-state division.    
The state is defined as: a geographic territory with internationally recognized 
boundaries; an internationally recognized and identifiable population that lives within 
those boundaries; and an internationally recognized authority structure or government 
(Duncan et al. 2006, 70).  This is a fairly basic definition that leaves out the political and 
philosophical debates on the creation and justification for the modern state system.  
While most political philosophers, such as Marx, Weber, Hobbes, and Locke, have input 
on the meaning of the state, I find Weber's definition also useful.  He connects violence 
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and force to states, supporting Trotsky's remark that “every state is based on force” (qtd. 
in Politics as Vocation, 33).  Weber continues by claiming that the modern state “is the 
form of human community that (successfully) lays claim to the monopoly of legitimate 
physical violence within a particular territory- and this idea of 'territory' is an essential 
defining feature” (33).  This then leads to the role of power and who has it which 
reinforces the power structures of Gramsci's theory of hegemony.  
 A clear understanding of globalization also seems necessary in this study.  Jan 
Aart Scholte (2005) describes globalization as: “a shift in the nature of social space 
caused by the spread of transplanetary and supraterritorial connections between people-
particularly to the extent that physical space becomes obsolete or much less of a barrier to 
social connections in the past” (59).  Scholte defines keywords, transplanetary and 
supraterritorial, as connecting to space.  Transplanetary is thought of as being “across 
the planet” (61).  In this, territoriality still exists and matters, but it goes beyond 
international relations.  Supraterritorial is considered to “transcend territorial 
geography;” it is “delinked” from actual territories without any constraint on space (61).  
I use this definition of globalization for its reliance on social connections and space.  For 
instance, the UN World Conference on Racism could be considered an example of a 
newly emerging transplanetary space which has an important role in national policy and 
identity constructions against racism and other forms of exclusion. Yet, this space is still 
very much connected to local places when sub-national social movements return to the 
national or local level to implement change.   
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   Nationalism as Either-Or Constructions  
 
 One area of nationalism scholarship needs to be discussed due to the complex 
relationship between the Dalit movement, the caste structure, Hindu nationalism and 
modern anti-discrimination policy.  Past debates over nationalism focused around either-
or constructions.  Is nationalism civic-based or ethnic-based?  Most current scholars 
(Walker 2003; Ozkirimli 2005) argue that instead of these exclusive claims there is a 
middle-ground.    
 Umut Ozkirimli (2005), in Contemporary Debates on Nationalism: A Critical 
Engagement, discusses the ethnic versus civic forms of nationalism.  Civic nationalism, 
he writes, is “a shared commitment to the public institutions of the state and civil society” 
(23).  Ozkirimli quotes Ignatieff as arguing that civic nationalism “maintains that the 
nation should be composed of all those-regardless of race, color, creed, gender, language 
or ethnicity-who subscribe to the nation's political creed” (23).  Ozkirimli continues by 
describing ethnic nationalism as “a contrast” which “emphasizes common descent and 
cultural sameness” (23).  Civic nationalism is believed to be inclusive, while ethnic 
nationalism is thought of as exclusive.   
 It is not quite this easy, however.  Ozkirimli continues by pointing out the 
problematic nature of these two typologies:  
since all nations lay claim to a unique place in history and to certain 
boundaries, all national identities are exclusionary.  In that sense, all 
nations are ethnic nations (24).   
 
Similarly, he debunks civic nationalism for its “oxymoronic quality,” quoting Laitin 
(2001): 
the term 'nation' connotes a community into which a person is born, while 
  18   
the term 'civic' connotes a community to which a person belongs by choice 
or common belief.   And if the common belief is of putative common 
ancestry, or if the choice is to believe in common ancestry, is the national 
idea still civic? (qtd in Ozkirimli 24). 
 
Ozkirimli concludes on the distinction between ethnic and civic nationalisms by calling 
them “bogus, both in theory and in practice” (28).  Instead, one should view the civic-
ethnic constructions on a linear scale with degrees of synthesis between the two.   
Regarding Indian nationalism, this idea maintains credibility.  Historically, Indian 
nationalism is more ethnic than civic, being structured on caste hierarchies.  Bannerji 
(2006), in “Making India Hindu and Male,” argues that Indian nationalism is completely 
constructed on the premise of Hinduism.  He, however, further elaborates that “Hindu” 
means the Hindu right of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP).  He asserts that the BJP 
promotes “aggressive masculinity and organized violence” as an attempt to construct and 
maintain the national space.  Lower castes and non-Hindu religions thus are left with the 
option to flee, conform, or fight back.   
 Rogers Brubaker (2004), in Ethnicity without Groups, also comments on the 
ethnic-civic distinction, noting their ambiguities and concluding that one can not continue 
to see them as “mutually exclusive” (139). He argues for an alternative: the state-framed 
or counter-framed forms of nationalism.  He recognizes the “state-framed” mode to 
conceive of nation as “congruent with the state,” while the “counter-state” mode thinks of 
nation as an “imagined...distinct form, and often in opposition to, the territorial and 
institutional frame of an existing state or states” (144).  This alternative theory is 
supported by the case of India and the Dalit movement.   
 Lastly on this topic, Stephen Shulman's (2002) article on “Challenging the 
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Civic/Ethnic and West/East Dichotomies in the Study of Nationalism” is useful.  It 
references Hans Kohn's (1944) ideas of West/East divisions and connects them with 
civic/ethnic divisions.  Shulman tests the appropriateness of these connections of 
Civc/West and Ethnic/East by completing survey data on 15 countries.  Overall, he 
concludes that “Western civic nations are more ethnic than is usually recognized, and 
Eastern ethnic nations are more civic” (554-5).      
 All of these often-conceived oppositional nationalisms connect with one another 
upon closer analysis.  This is also true of the political or cultural forms of nationalism.  
None can be envisioned without the other.  While I recognize the importance of 
understanding the previous frameworks constructed regarding nationalism, it seems 
unnecessary dialogue when trying to understand the concrete ways in which nationalism 
is produced and challenged from below and how the transnational arena affects the 
outcomes in individual movements and nations.   
 Having said that, I agree with the recent conclusions by many scholars that there 
is not an either-or form of nationalism; rather, I see the complexity of nationalism in the 
permeable ways it is imagined, invented, projected and challenged.  Politics or culture, 
civic or ethnic, West or East, polis or cosmopolis are not fixed boundaries but instead 
shape one another and can be thought of as a continuum of more political or more 
cultural, more civic or more ethnic, but never one or the other.  Gerard Delanty (2008) in 
his review of Jonathan Hearn's Rethinking Nationalism: A Critical Introduction, reiterates 
some of these points: “nationalism can be many things at once-a feeling or consciousness, 
identity, an idea or movement and process...nationalism [is] multifaceted”  (399).     
 Della Porta et al. (2005) discuss the need for alternative conceptions of politics 
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and the necessary balance between dichotomies such as polis and cosmopolis.  She 
asserts the need for politics to become congruous with the public and the masses.  She 
writes, “the search for the polis, which political parties and institutions are accused of 
betraying, is expressed as the need for the public to reclaim political activity, stressing 
participation and attempting to construct values and identities (as opposed to 
administrating the existent)” (213).  This is exactly what the Dalit movement is 
attempting to do.  The entry into national politics seems necessary to reframe nationalism 
since it is most often a part of a national project constructed by political institutions and 
elites in order to maintain control over citizenship and inclusion.  When considering the 
Dalit movement it is necessary, however, to link the nationalism debates with race and 
nation.       
     Race and Nation(alism) 
 When analyzing nation and nationalism, one important form of the categorization 
of who is included and who is not is a racial or ethnic division.  I've already remarked on 
Anthony Marx's ideas on race, nation and ethnic nationalisms, but have not yet fully 
examined this perspective of race in relation to nation-making.  The connection between 
race and nation is important for this study as I am only looking at a movement which has 
participated in the 2001 UN World Conference Against Racism.  Marx's book, Making 
Race and Nation (1998), provides a theoretical perspective on the invention of race and 
inclusion/exclusion.  Other authors provide variations of these ideas or propose 
something different.  For instance, Guibernau's (1996) ideas, in Nationalisms, seem to 
correspond with Marx's.  He states, “race is a way of naming the difference between 
members of a particular collectivity and the 'other', 'the alien'.  Race establishes a 
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boundary” (85) between those included in a given national project and those considered 
on the periphery.  
The social construction of race as well as the inclusion/exclusion division is 
supported by Omi and Winant (1986).  Although their work focuses on the United States, 
it relates to racial formation across boundaries and borders.  They claim that race is 
socially constructed and that this then constructs racial categories and identities which are 
constantly “formed, transformed, destroyed and re-formed” (61).  They continue by 
stating that what they call “racial formation” refers to “the process by which social, 
economic, and political forces determine the content and importance of racial categories, 
and by which they are in turn shaped by racial means.” (61-2).  The history of the Dalits 
as a group have most certainly been altered and transformed by Indian society as well as 
the lengthy period of colonization.     
Numerous scholars argue, as they do with respect to nationalism, that there is an 
increase or decrease in racialization along discriminatory national lines.  Harrison (2005) 
states, “political, social, and economic human rights violations-and the inequalities in 
power and resources that permit them-appear to be on the rise” (10).  Harrison supports 
the structural violence claim as seen by Reitan (2007) because of a noted increase in both 
hegemonic discrimination and social movements opposing it (and the neoliberal order).  
While I support many of the arguments by these scholar-activists, I disagree with them on 
the stance of nationalism.  They support Jonathan Friedman's (1994) claim that 
nationalism is in a crisis and is weakening due to the “outcome of cultural processes that 
global economic forces engender” (13).  The articles in this collection stress the need for 
a reanalysis of power and who has access to it.  They also stress the importance of 
  22   
recognizing divisions among the “isms” of sex/gender, race (and caste), and class.   
 Anthony D. Smith (1995), in Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era, states that 
there is a contemporary and global risk for the resurgence of ethnic conflict and 
nationalism.  He writes, “in the era of globalization and transcendence, we find ourselves 
caught in a maelstrom of conflicts over political identities and ethnic fragmentation” (2).  
He notes that there is an increased break-down of the “homogenous nation” where 
national identities are becoming fragmented, hybridized, and less structured.   The Dalit 
movement exemplifies this; as it become less excluded and more included there is an 
increase in discrimination and violence to reassert exclusion.  Similar to Islamic 
fundamentalism, the Hindu nationalists are trying to retain cultural and political traditions 
of caste hierarchy. 
 Other authors look at the specific cases of race and nation.  Fredrickson (1997) 
traces racism as national projects in the United States and South Africa through a 
comparative historical method.  He also looks at how social movements in both areas 
have served to alter, even if very slowly, the racist policy which may be construed as a 
part of the national projects of inclusion and exclusion.  Similarly, Spickard (2005), in 
Race and Nation, connects race and ethnicity to the nation.  Through a collection of 
essays, Spickard examines how ethnic systems are constructed and maintained.  While I 
understand that this is not the focus of Spickard, he pays more attention to race than to 
the conjunctions between national projects and racial projects.  However, this book is 
successful in providing concrete examples of racial systems in the modern era and hint, 
sometimes more obviously than others, at the national projects that coincide with them.   
 Yoshino (1999) also looks at cases of racialized national projects.  He finds it 
  23   
useful to distinguish between political and cultural nationalisms, but does not see the 
constructiveness of participating in the discourse on what is happening to nationalism.  
Instead, the book seeks to show how nationalism is being produced and reproduced in 
areas previously not studied.    Particularly, the “consumption of nationalism” is explored 
in how ethnicity in Asia is utilized to propose, enforce, and then reproduce nationalism in 
both a cultural and political manner.   
 Lastly, T.K. Oommen (1997) is helpful for his connections among race, nation and 
citizenship.  In Citizenship, Nationality and Ethnicity, he claims citizenship as a useful 
way to reconcile nationality and ethnicity.  He writes, “one must recognize the role of 
citizenship as an instrument that can reconcile the two identities of nationality and 
ethnicity and the competing demands of equality and identity” (243).  He notes, however, 
the exclusionary practices of even citizenship, but sees it as the most likely way for 
excluded groups to feel included even if they are still experiencing discrimination and 
exclusion from higher class-standing and access to resources.  I agree that citizenship is 
one manner in which appears to enable inclusion; yet, I don't think this means that all 
groups are actually included.   
 When perceiving race as a factor in national projects, Hearn (2007) is most 
insightful.  In “National Identity: Banal, Personal and Embedded,” he looks at the various 
levels of nationalism, from the national to the personal.  He writes,  
national identity does not exist in two polar forms-one inscribed on the 
inner self, the other suspended in the discursive other.  Rather, it gets 
reproduced along a series of relations, as individuals reach out through the 
various forms of social organization that frame their particular lives and 
circumstances (671).   
 
He also, as the title suggests, looks at Billing's (1995) concept of “banal” nationalism.   
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The term banal nationalism is introduced to cover the ideological habits 
which  enable  the established nations of the West to be reproduced.  It is 
argued that these habits are not removed from everyday life, as some 
observers have supposed.  Daily, the nation is indicated, or 'flagged' in the 
lives of its citizenry.  Nationalism, far from being an intermittent mood in 
established nations, is the endemic condition (qtd. in Hearn, 660). 
 
These reproductions, whether symbolic or ideological are seen in the “everyday life” of 
discrimination as seen in overtly discriminatory policy or the subversive structural 
problems which appear as natural to most citizens.  From a cultural aspect this relates to 
the idea of simulacra-the idea of a copy of a copy without any reference to an original 
(Baudrillard).    
    Nationalism and Globalization      
 
 Hedetoft (2003), in The Global Turn: National Encounters with the World, 
participates in the globalization debate over whether on not it is new, supporting the 
viewpoint that “globalization is both real, unique and deeply consequential for the nation-
state and the international system,” but contends that this “does not imply the withering-
away of the national state, but a process of adaptive structural repositioning through 
which it undergoes a profound change” (2).  Hedetoft views the nation-state and 
globalization as two differing sites where they are neither contradictory nor necessarily 
complimentary.  
 Both Held (1999) and Scholte (2005) struggle with this issue of globalization's 
newness or lack thereof.  They, however, go about the discussion in different ways.  
Scholte provides a more normative and somewhat prescriptive approach, emphasizing a 
“newness” in degree and kind   Held, instead, provides a historical framework, stressing 
the change in extensity, intensity, velocity and impact propensity, or the “newness” by 
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degree and not kind.  With regards to nationalism, Scholte views globalization as 
undermining nationalism or at least providing other ways in which it is formed.  He looks 
to the hybridization of identities as a new way in which people collectively identify.  He 
links the decrease in national identity formation to space, commenting, “a relative 
deterritorialization of social space could therefore be expected to transpire hand in hand 
with a relative denationalization of social identity” (225).  Scholte sees increasingly 
plural national identities which may coincide with Kaldor's view on new and small 
nationalisms.   
 Mary Kaldor (2004) argues that nationalism is responding to globalization, calling 
it a “new nationalism” which is “both shaped by, and shapes, the various phenomena we 
bunch together under the rubric of globalization” (162).  She states that this new 
nationalism will be “regressive” and “contribute to a wild, anarchic form of globalization, 
characterized by violence and inequality” (162).  While disagreeing with both Anthony 
Smith and Eric Hobsbawm, she finds possibility in Guibernau's (1996) concept of “small 
nationalisms” (162).  She contrasts these small nationalisms , as seen by European open 
(national) identities, with the exclusionary “fundamentalist political networks”  (175).  
She notes that these open small nationalisms are able to be “mobilized not only from 
above, but also from below by the human rights regime and peace movements” (175).    
 Saul Newman (2000), in “Nationalism in Postindustrial Societies: Why States Still 
Matter,” brings the discussion back to how the nation-state is effected by globalization.  
He suggests that perhaps there is a “transformation” occurring called “globalization.”  
He, however, reasserts the emphasis to the context of states and how they respond.  He 
argues that in studying nationalism it “would be well-advised to keep nationalist 
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movements and parties front and center in its analyses” (39).  He highlights a point made 
by several scholars, which is the threat of fundamentalist movements and terrorism as a 
response to globalization.  This is an interesting area of study, but outside the realm of the 
intended research project.   
 This brings up the importance of power structures and dynamics when discussing 
nationalism and globalization.  Held emphasizes power when understanding 
contemporary debates over globalization and nationalism.  While this too could be 
discussed at length in a book or separate article it is only important to recognize here.  
Power, to one degree or another, is what movements are trying to gain and what national 
projects are trying to maintain.  With power comes inclusion to the national identity if not 
the ability to reconfigure what it means.  It also translates into access to resources, which 
in turn, have the ability to lead to education, wealth, and the chance to participate in the 
local, national or even, global economy.   
 Scholte's reliance on the importance of space or the increasing lack of needing to 
rely on space creates a need to reassert the importance of territory on nationalism in this 
study.  Ruth Reitan's (2007) amended scale shift model demonstrates the process of going 
global and how it, in turn, affects the local, calling it “glocal.”  It is a completely reflexive 
relationship, one in which the importance of space continues to be relevant.   
 Della Porta et al. (2006), in Globalization from Below, claim that territorial 
identities do not fade but are increasingly impacted by other places and cultures.  This is 
leading to resistance movements to defend traditional cultures, which in turn, lead to a 
resurgence of nationalism, ethnic movements and religious mobilization (15).  The Dalit 
movement, which is considered to be a member of the Global Justice movement through 
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its continuous participation in the World Social Forum, is in fact against a traditional 
culture and nationalism for its history of witnessing exclusion, discrimination and 
violence.  Yet, perhaps it is globalization and transnational forums which have enabled 
movements to more loudly resist the traditional culture by gaining support from the 
international human rights regime and other nations who view the Dalit cause as 
legitimate.  These forums and networks are thought of as alternative inclusive networks.  
The problems experienced by the Dalit community in India were recognized by the 
United Nations in August of 2001, the European Union in May of 2007, and lastly, the 
United States Congress in July of 2007 (NCDHR website).   
  Nationalism from Below: the Transnational and Social Movements 
   Dallmayr and Rosales (2001) consider nationalism to be “at a crossroads today” 
(xv).  I do not intend to demonstrate what nationalism is changing to, but instead seek to 
show one route for potential changes to a given national identity.  This route is 
understood as “going global” to the transnational level in order to experience success, 
inclusivity, and then return to the national level to also experience success and growth in 
politics. 
 Transnational forums are emerging global spaces which enable territory-based 
movements to share solidarity.  Ruth Reitan (2007) examines why movements and 
networks have shifted scale to the global (230).  She concludes that this takes place so 
that solidarity can occur in any of the following ways:  
those of worthiness for distant issues and sufferers, 
interconnectedness with others whose struggles are seen as related to one's 
own, and similarity with activists sharing the same identity which is 
harmed or threatened (231).   
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Reitan makes another significant contribution to work on transnationalism and social 
movements which is that “networks have moved well beyond protest toward proposal” 
(258).  What she means is that the traditional protest methods of social movements have 
advanced to not only protest, but propose alternatives to the hegemonic policy and 
projects that have guided the top-down approach.  Iain Bruce (Ed.) (2004) argues this 
point as well.   
 Peter N. Funke (2008) postulates that the World Social Forum is an “open space” 
where a “resistance relay” may then take place.  By this, Funke means that “like a relay, 
social forums try to 'open' circuits that are stronger than social forum's own current and 
thus hope to function as a sort of catalyst or amplifier for convergences” (459).  The 
opening of transnational social movement networks is supported by most scholars of 
globalization and social movements.   
 The success of bottom-up transnational networks is in several factors: it fosters 
solidarity among participants from all over the globe, creating what many scholars refer 
to as the “global citizen”.  With this solidarity comes an exchange of tactics, frames, 
grievances and visibility.  For instance, the Dalit movement's National Campaign of Dalit 
Human Rights (NCDHR) has visited and publicly united with Brazil's Landless Workers' 
Movement and several movements from Japan.   
 Despite all of the recent scholarly attention paid to the transnational, Della Porta 
et al. (2005) suggest it is also important to note how these transnational imaginings affect 
the internal politics and cultures of nations.  Reitan also reinforces this argument with her 
amended scale shift model.     
 
  29   
 
 
 
 
           Chapter Three 
 
        Case Study: India's Dalit Movement and Hindu Nationalism  
     
    Background Information 
      
      
        
 The Dalit movement in India has existed in numerous forms since the late 1800s.  
Nick Crossley (2002) states, social movements are important because “they are key 
agents for bringing about change within societies” (8).  Despite the Dalit movement’s 
transformations over time, it has consistently sought to do just that: challenge and change 
Indian society.  In particular, it seeks to alter the Hindu caste structure, the formation and 
power of Hindu nationalism, and the exclusion of “Untouchables” and lower castes from 
vital resources, such as water, education, housing, jobs, and access to the global economy.   
 Entering politics remains a longstanding tactic of the movement as a way to gain 
power.  A Dalit leader from Andhra Pradesh comments, “We want annihilation of the 
caste system and the only way we can do this is if we get political power and we're going 
to fight for political power” (Unreported World: India's Broken People interview).  The 
thrust of the movement into politics is best demonstrated in the 1984 formation of the 
Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP), a Dalit-based national political party.  For this reason, along 
with the movements' trajectory of “going global,” it is a fitting case study for the larger 
purpose of exploring nationalism today and its potential for change from below by sub-
national movements.   
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 The Dalit movement is very much still a territory-based movement in India with 
pockets of mobilization throughout the Indian states (Figure 1: Map of India).  It also has, 
however, since the late 1990s and especially by 2001, participated in the transnational 
social movement network.  By “going global” it has been able to find an inclusive 
community, share ideas and tactics, unify with other movements and their goals, gain 
international attention for the Dalit cause, and lastly, change the framing strategies of the 
movement so that they are more universally understandable.   
  
 
  
    
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
      
 
 Figure 1:  Map of India 
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           The Hegemony of India's Caste Structure and Nationalism  
 The Caste system exists of four castes, varnas, which literally means “color” 
although it is somewhat metaphorical in this case (Channa 2005).  There are numerous 
sub-classes, or jatis, within each caste to which someone is born, lives, and dies 
traditionally. The Dalits' or “Untouchables'” place within the caste-system is actually 
beneath it, but this placement comes with a set of duties like all other castes.  Each caste 
has a dharma, the Sanskrit word for “duty” or “religion”.  The Braham is the highest 
caste made up of priests; the Kshatriyas are rulers, warriors, and landowners; the Vaishya 
are merchants; Sudras are farmers, artisans, and servants.  The Dalits' function within the 
system is to do the work that no other respectable person would do such as cleaning up 
human waste, disposing of dead animals, particularly cows (a sacred animal to Hindus), 
and/or making leather.  Historically, no other castes were supposed to interact with 
“Untouchables” and most certainly not come in physical contact with them (Luce 2007).  
Female Dalits have typically suffered a double blow- being Dalits and females.  Higher 
caste males are allowed to use female Dalits for sex as is apparent in the high rape 
statistics on Dalit women.  More specific details regarding Dalit discrimination will be 
forth coming.     
 This antiquated system of caste hierarchy is, in part, what Hindu nationalists seek 
to uphold, as recognized in the Hindutva philosophy.  Thomas Blom Hansen (1999), in 
The Saffron Wave: Democracy and Hindu Nationalism in Modern India, reinforces this 
claim; he states, “the Hindu nationalists desire to transform Indian public culture into a 
sovereign, disciplined national culture rooted in what is claimed to be a superior ancient 
Hindu past, and to impose a corporatist and disciplined social and political organization 
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upon society” (4).   He also considers this idealization of the Hindu past in the form of 
nationalism to have “emerged out of the longest, most sustained, and most successful 
trajectory of democracy anywhere in the postcolonial world” (5).  Chetan Bhatt (2001), in 
Hindu Nationalism: Origins, Ideologies and Modern Myths, remarks that the Hindu ideas 
on caste have “developed in conjunction with...conceptions of nation” (3).  Many Dalits 
throughout history, like Ambedkar, have converted from Hinduism as a way to remove 
themselves from the caste system.  The Hindu nationalists wish to reassert it as the 
primary identity of India and its people.  This is done, in part, through the use of force, 
violence, discriminatory practices, and politics, as seen by the BJP.         
  Hindu Nationalism and the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) 
 Nationalism in India today is founded, in part, on two core perspectives: the 
influence of European primordialist ideologies on colonial India and the previously 
established caste-hierarchy of Hinduism (amended from Hansen 1999; Bhatt 2001).  
Chetan Bhatt (2001) states, “while regional nationalisms and local patries had existed in 
India before the colonial period, an overarching framework that served to provide 
ideological coherence for the idea of a primordial nationalism, primarily defined through 
an invention of archaic Verdic Hinduism, mainly gained force from the nineteenth 
century” (10).   
 Hobsbawm states, in Nations and Nationalism since 1780 (1990), the idea of 
nation and nationalism is no older than 18th century.  While the caste system is centuries 
old, only since the colonial period has India construct the concept of nationalism as a 
unified identity.  Ambedkar states, “it must be recognized that there never has been a 
common Indian culture, that historically there have been three Indias, Brahmanic India, 
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Buddhist India and Hindu India, each with its own culture” (qtd in Omvedt 43).  Instead, 
pre-colonial India maintained pockets of local or regional identities, often affiliated with 
the territories, languages, and religions (Omvedt 2006;  Zavos 2000; Hansen 1999).  
Colonial rule, however, stressed a geopolitical unified identity and this seemed most 
conveniently to correspond with the caste structure.  Upon independence and the 
partitioning of India and Pakistan in 1947, the Indian identity became territory-based but 
also faith-based.  According to a 2001 census (www.cia.gov), India is made up of about 
80.5% Hindu, 13.4% Muslim, 2.3% Christian, 1.9% Sikh, and other or unspecified at 
1.9%. 
 Despite claims of equality and diversity, nationalism in India is fiercely embedded 
in traditional Hindu beliefs.  Modern urban centers often seem more equal for minority 
religions and lower castes; yet, a Hindu-derived identity has only increased since 
independence due to residual problems regarding the partition of Pakistan and 
resentments felt by both Muslims and Hindus alike.  
 Hindutva in a concept derived from a 1923 pamphlet by V.D. Savarkar, who 
stressed India as both a holy-land and a fatherland, asserting a form of ethnic nationalism 
(Bhatt).  Extreme forms of this perspective faded slightly during the mid-20th century but 
reemerged by the 1980s, especially with the founding of the BJP, a political party based 
on these teachings.   
 The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) has a history intertwined with previously 
established parties, movements and ideologies such as Hindutva, Sangh Parivar and 
Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) and the Bharatiya 
Jana Sangh party.  Sang Parivar, the VHP and the RSS are nationalist organizations that 
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emerged at the height of Aryan race theories in the early 1900s and have maintained 
support among both moderate and conservative Hindus.   
 The BJP emerged in 1980 as a moderate party, claiming to support diversity and 
equality in India.  It has many platform issues it is known for, but for the purposes of this 
study it is important in its historical connections with Hindutva and Hindu-based 
nationalist organizations.  The BJP is directly linked with the Bharatiya Jana Sangh party 
which was created in 1951; both the BJP and BJS are connected to the Rashtriya 
Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) which was an organization created in 1925 (Luce 2007; 
Hansen 1999; Bhatt 2001; Malik and Singh 1994).   
 While the BJP advocates equality and inclusivity, it at the same time relies on 
rhetoric that stresses the threat of outside influences, particularly the unwillingness of 
Muslims to support change in India.  The BJP website claims, “Hindu society has an 
unquestionable and proud history of tolerance for other faiths and respect for diversity of 
spiritual experiences” (www.bjp.org).  And yet, it later states, “Hindutva is here to stay. It 
is up to the Muslims whether they will be included in the new nationalistic spirit of 
Bharat (India)”.  One might wonder, however, how it is possible for Muslims to fully “be 
included” when “Hindutva is here to stay.”   
 Smith's (1995) claim that nationalism is resurging as a tool to defend tradition and 
cultures, causing increased ethnic conflicts, is relevant to Hindu nationalists and the way 
they struggle to maintain tradition at the perceived threat of contestation.  The BJP 
upholds the traditional Hindu belief system, including the caste structure.  They resent the 
Muslim minority within India, in part, to the partitioning of “their own land” into 
modern-day India and Pakistan (www.bjp.org).  For this reason, they urge India to remain 
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committed to its Hinduist history, values, majority, and caste structure.   
   Enforcing Exclusion: Discrimination and Dalits    
 Dalits have been fighting back against exclusion and discriminatory practices 
since the late 1800s.  Despite policy supporting equal rights violence continues.  While 
there is no proof that the BJP actively advocates discriminatory practices towards Dalits, 
they do so by ignoring such practices and by supporting traditional Hindutva ideology.  
Various policies call for equality in India, but at the same time it is recognized that these 
policies are not effectively enforced (ncdhr.org; Human Rights Watch).   
 Despite article seventeen of the 1950 Indian Constitution, which declares equality 
amongst all castes and races and bans any form of discrimination, violence in India's 
stratified society persists.  The Prevention of Atrocities Act of 1989 also seeks to end 
discrimination.  Human Rights Documentation Centre (hrdc.net) of India states:  
The Act attempts to curb and punish violence against Dalits through three 
broad means.  Firstly, it identifies what acts constitute 'atrocities.' These 
include both particular incidents of harm and humiliation such as the 
forced consumption of noxious substances, as well as the systemic 
violence still faced by many Dalits, especially in rural areas. Such 
systemic violence includes forced labor, denial of access to water and 
other public amenities, and sexual abuse of Dalit women.  Secondly, the 
Act calls upon all the states to convert an existing sessions court in each 
district into a Special Court to try cases registered under the POA. Thirdly, 
the Act creates provisions for states to declare areas with high levels of 
caste violence to be “atrocity-prone” and to appoint qualified officers to 
monitor and maintain law and order.  
 
Yet, as the National Campaign on Dalit Human Rights (NCDHR) argues, there is not 
proper enforcement.  The Human Rights Documentation Centre claims, “although the 
POA is a powerful and precise weapon on paper, in practice the Act has suffered from a 
near-complete failure in implementation.” 
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 Discrimination against Dalits takes many forms with varying degrees of tragedy 
and violence:  sexual assault on Dalit women, the burning and brutal killing of Dalit 
families, police brutality and a glass-ceiling effect keeping the majority of Dalits from 
well-paying jobs and education.  There is a difference between the idealism as seen in the 
Indian Constitution and the lived reality of Dalits in modern India.  R.M. Pal is quoted on 
the Human Rights Watch website stating, “the constitution has merely prescribed, but has 
not given any description of the ground reality.  We can make a dent only if we recognize 
the fact that the cast system is a major source, indeed an obnoxious one, of human rights 
violations” (www.hrw.org/reports/1999/india).  This is, in fact, what Human Rights 
Watch set out to do when they published a book titled Broken People: Caste Violence 
against India's “Untouchables” (1999).   
 The National Campaign on Dalit Human Rights along with a variety of other 
organizations, such as Human Rights Watch, International Dalit Solidarity Network and 
both the United Nations and the European Union, have gathered data on the 
discriminatory practices against Dalits.  NCDHR supported a study that gathered 
statistics from 11 states and over 565 villages throughout India.  A sampling of these 
statistics is provided below to emphasize the violence and discrimination that occurs 
against Dalits on a daily basis.   
? up to 38% of Dalit children in  government schools are forced to sit separately 
while eating 
? in 20% of schools, Dalit children are not allowed to drink from the same water 
source 
? 27.6% of Dalits are not permitted to enter police stations 
? 25.7% have been denied access to ration shops 
? 33% of public health workers have refused to visit Dalit homes 
? 48.4% of Dalits in villages have been denied access to the public water source 
? 73% have not been allowed to enter a non-Dalit home 
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? 70% have been denied eating with non-Dalits 
? in 10-20% of villages surveyed Dalits were not allowed to wear “clean, bright 
or fashionable clothing.”   
 
These are just a few of the restrictions placed on Dalits, not including the actual violence 
they experience.  The International Dalit Solidarity Network (IDSN) cites “official Indian 
crime statistics” between 2001 and 2005.  It has calculated that about 27 atrocities occur 
against Dalits every day, 13 Dalits are murdered every week, 5 Dalit homes are burnt 
every week, 6 Dalits are kidnapped ever week, 3 Dalit women are raped every day, 11 
Dalits are beat every day, and a crime according to Indian law is committed against a 
Dalit every 18 minutes (www.idsn.org).    
  One brief story from National Geographic (Mayell, June 2003) demonstrates this 
assertion of force by higher castes on the lower castes: 
One night, while Maurya was away in a nearby city, eight men from the 
higher Rajput  caste came to his farm.  They broke his fences, stole his 
tractor, beat his wife and daughter, and burned down his house.  The 
message was clear: Stay at the bottom where you belong.” 
 
Other incidents have been reported throughout India newspapers, academics and 
organizations alike.  Human Rights Watch, in Broken People (1999), writes that between 
1994 and 1996, 98,349 cases were registered with the police as crimes against scheduled 
castes.  This number seems rather low compared to the 160-170 million Dalits in India, 
yet it is likely that there is a higher statistic of actual violence versus what is reported.   
 The Human Rights Documentation Centre says that part of the problem is that 
“policemen have displayed a consistent unwillingness to register offences under the act. 
This reluctance stems partially from ignorance. According to a 1999 study nearly a 
quarter of those government officials charged with enforcing the Act are unaware of its 
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existence” (hrdc.net).  Human Rights Watch also argues that there is a lack of 
enforcement.  Similarly, Amnesty International estimated that roughly only 5 percent of 
attacks are registered (qtd. in Mayell 2003).  IDSN cites that about 18.7% of crimes 
against Dalits were pending with police at the end of 2002 while 77.69% of the court 
cases were pending.  In 2005, pending police investigation of crimes against Dalits was at 
23.9% and 80.2% of these crimes were pending a trial by the end of 2005.   
 On September 29th, 2006 an event took place in Maharashtra that has become 
known as the Kherlanji Massacre (www.ibn.com; www.autrocitynew.worldpress.com) in 
which a Dalit family was murdered by higher caste members for asserting rights to land.  
A wife, daughter, and two sons were stripped naked; the females allegedly raped, and 
were then beaten, maimed and killed.  Very little was done about the incident and brought 
about a reactionary violence by Dalits in response to such violence by upper-castes.      
 Subhadra Mitra Channa (2005), states that the discrimination of Dalits persists 
particularly through geographic segregation in urban and rural areas.  She provides the 
example of Dalits in Delhi, where they live in small tenements in the slums of a section 
of the city.  She also links, as do many other academics (Jefferey 2004), to the social 
segregation especially in education and the school systems.  Access to water is also 
limited for Dalits.  In one village the state installed a specific water tap for Dalits, but it 
quickly became used by upper-caste villagers.  Channa quotes one Dalit villagers as 
saying, “the government can provide taps for the untouchables, but it can not give them 
the courage to use them” (51).  Overall, Channa provides insight into some of the more 
subtle forms of discrimination.  Her outlook on the modern Dalit condition is somewhat 
bleak as she writes, “almost fifty years down the line, in spite of a fair number of 
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untouchables having become political leaders and holding responsible jobs, their position 
has undergone little change” (51).  Her article tries to show how a system of oppression 
“survives in subtle and covert forms and has its roots deeply entrenched even when 
apparently uprooted and done away with in legislation and overt social norms” (51).   
 Discrimination and violence in India is not only experienced by Dalits, but is also 
a lived reality for many Muslim, Christian, Buddhist, and other non-Hindu Indian citizens 
(Kamat and Mathew 2003).  These groups, like the Dalits, are excluded from the Hindu 
nationalist ideology and identity.  The Dalit movement and the Bahujan Samaj Party 
often embrace these other outsiders.   
 Discriminatory practices continue to permeate Indian society.  It is difficult to 
determine if violence against Dalits is decreasing, increasing or remaining the same since 
statistics do not prove to be entirely accurate.  Wever-Rabhel (2006)(qtd in O’Neil, 2003, 
30) comments,  
Until India's 'hidden apartheid' is abolished...the world's largest democracy 
is nothing but a palace built on a dung heap. 
 
  Subaltern Actions: Historical Tracings of the Dalit Movement  
 Among scholars there is not a consensus on when the Dalit movement officially 
began.  Luce (2007) references the Dalit Panthers as the first mass-mobilization of Dalits 
in 1972.  Pai (2002) connects modern day Dalit organization to the small movements of 
the colonial period.  Most scholars (Joshi 1986; Smith 2008; Omvedt 2006; Bob 2007), 
however, consider Dr. Bhimrao Rumji (B.R.) Ambedkar to be the first person to focus on 
the “autonomy of the Dalit movement” (Omvedt, 43).   Although Ambedkar is the most 
commonly referenced Dalit leader other leaders have also significantly impacted its 
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strength, tactics, and audience throughout the movement's history.   
 Tactics, leaders, and small goals have shifted throughout time, yet, the 
fundamental goal of Dalit inclusion and equality has not changed since the late 1800s.   
Table 1 (below) presents a historical overview of Dalit movement leaders and 
organizations since its inception.  It should be noted that it is not holistic since access to 
some of this information is either not readily available or overwhelming in its quantity.  
For instance, Dalit organizations today are in the thousands and stretch across the globe.   
A direct link between generations of leaders and organizations has not been made 
clear in academic literature.  In fact, few scholars examining the Dalit movement today 
have spent sufficient time tracing its roots back throughout India’s history.  Doing so, 
however, reinforces the steadfast nature of this movement despite changing tactics, 
organizations and leadership.  It also demonstrates a continual assertion of the importance 
of politics in achieving the long-term goal of Dalit inclusion.  
Jotiba Govindrao Phule (1827-1890) was a Dalit leader who began by proposing 
alternative religions to Hinduism that would emphasize equality.  Omvedt (2006) notes, 
“Phule is today taken as a founding figure in Maharashtra [a Western Indian state] not 
simply by the anti-caste but also by the farmers, women's and rural-based environmental 
movements” (21).  He questioned the Aryan race theory which was prominent during the 
time and greatly influenced some of the Dalit leaders of the 1920s who framed their 
movement according to race/ethnicity.  Phule also founded the Satya Shadohak Samaj 
organization in 1875 which is the first well-known Dalit organization (Omvedt).  Satya 
Shadohak Samaj focused on uniting lower-castes and Dalits.  Its goals were to bring 
about equality and access to education for Dalits and lower-caste members (shudras).   
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Table 1: Historical Tracing of the Dalit Movement 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
In order to understand the early forms of the Dalit movement one must also 
understand what it was up against: the formation of Hindu nationalism in the early 1900s.  
The development of Hindu nationalism and its core ideological beliefs have already been 
presented, yet, this must be reiterated here because it was during the period of the late 
1800s and early 1900s that Hindu nationalism becomes a concrete ideology and 
movement.  Zavos (2000) states, “after the turn of the century, the idea of organized 
Hinduism began to assume an increasingly significant role in projections and counter-
projections of the Indian people, which were central to contemporary political discourse” 
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(99).  This is done so through the formation of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) 
and the Hindu Mahasabha, two organizations that promote an Indian national identity 
based on the Hindu caste system.   
 The emergence of Hindu nationalism between the late 1800s and early 1900s 
serves as a jumping-off point for the swell of Dalit activism which takes place in the 
1920s.  It may also justify the change in tactics of the Dalit movement to promoting itself 
as an identity-based coalition.  Omvedt states, regarding the differences between Phule 
and the activism of the 1920s, “a whole period of the construction of Hinduism had 
intervened, with the formulation of an increasingly sophisticated ideology of Hindu 
Nationalism” (39).   
 Movements in the 1920s continued to promote equality for Dalits.  They, 
however, changed one major aspect of the movement-unlike in previous times, they 
began to claim an “original Indian” identity or “adi”.  Omvedt points to the popular 
Aryan race theories of the time that influenced the Hindu nationalist movements as a 
pertinent reason the “adi” movements took hold.  She writes, “the adi ideologies were 
pervasive ideas that won a popular base, as census reports show, and expressed the 
powerful emotional resistance to brahmanism and caste hierarchy that was embodied in 
dalit organizations everywhere in the colonial period” (39).   
 Instead of allowing Hindu nationalist claims to resonate, Dalits, taking lessons 
from Phule, found a way to highlight their differences to upper-caste Brahmans and their 
colonizers.  They did so by founding various Dalit organizations, including the Ad-
Dharm in the northwestern Indian state of Punjab, Adi-Hindu in the northern central state 
of Uttar Pradesh and Hyderabad, a city in the southeastern state of Andhra Pradesh, Adi-
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Dravida, Adi-Andhra and Adi-Karnataka in the southern region of India.  Each of these 
organizations might be regarded as social movement organizations (SMOs), as defined by 
contemporary scholars of social movements (McCarthy and Zald 1977; Armstrong and 
Bartley 2007), in that they were created for the “collective pursuit of social change as a 
primary goal” (Armstrong and Bartley 2007).   
  A few notable leaders of this time period include Kisan Faguji Bansode (1870-
1946), Bhagyareddy Varma (1888-1939), and Mangoo Ram (1886-1980).  Bansode 
worked primarily in Maharashtra while Ram mostly organized in Punjab.  Mangoo Ram 
organized in 1926 a separatist organization, the Ad-Dharm, which sought to form a 
separate Dalit community in a Punjab village.  It was not met with much success.  
Bhagyareddy Varma was a leader who had been organizing Dalits since the early 1900s, 
especially adi-Hindu conferences.  He was connected to the “petty bourgeois dalit group” 
(Omvedt 36) and therefore, had access to more resources than most Dalits during the 
time.  He formed the Adi-Andhra Mahajana Sabha in 1917, which was an open 
conference of Dalits, meant to foster relationships and collaborate on necessary actions, 
goals, and tactics.  This, however, did not lead to a national level umbrella organization.  
That level of mobilization did not happen until Ambedkar became involved in the 
movement.     
 Evidence supports that these early leaders of the movement directly impacted Dr. 
B.R. Ambedkar (1891-1956), the most notable and studied Dalit leader.  Ambedkar, after 
returning to India sometime in the early 1920s from earning a law degree in the United 
States, quickly became involved in politics and the plight of Dalits. He too was a Dalit, 
although he grew up not experiencing the same casteism that other Dalits encountered.  
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He is thought to be the “most articulate Dalit leader” (Omvedt 44).  Unlike the 1920s 
movements, Ambedkar does not claim an indigenous identity, but instead finds fault with 
the construction of the Hindu caste system.  For this reason, he declares in 1935 that he 
was “born a Hindu but would not die a Hindu” (Ambekar.org).   
 In 1936, Ambedkar created the Independent Labour Party (ILP) as a way to fight 
for the Dalit cause from inside the political sphere.  While other leaders had also taken a 
political route for the Dalit movement, Ambedkar was the first to form a(n) (initially) 
successful political party.  Kanshi Ram, the founder of the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP), 
points to Ambedkar as an inspiration (Pai 2002).  The Independent Labour Party (ILP) 
was a worker-peasant party with goals that included ridding caste discrimination, but also 
focused on problems with capitalism, wealth distribution and equal access to resources.  
Ambedkar remained involved in both sides of the movement: the political process and the 
grassroots organization.  After Ambedkar died in 1956, the ILP slowly faded away. It was 
not until the Bahujan Samaj Party formation in 1984 that another Dalit-based political 
party emerged.      
 Ambedkar also organized the Bahishkrut Hitakarni Sabha (BHS), an organization 
structured around the goals of the Dalit movement.  Its purpose was to hold various 
conferences throughout Mahad, a city in the western state of Maharashtra.  It also acted 
as one of the earliest umbrella organizations, connecting smaller movements and 
mobilizing individuals.  For instance, the Mahad Satyagraha, the “first untouchable 
liberation movement in Mahad” (Omvedt 44), met with Ambedkar and the BHS around 
1926 by attending the conferences.  Its tactics, however, were more radical than those 
utilized by Ambedkar.  The Mahad Satyagraha led marches to drink the water from the 
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village tanks, which was prohibited for Dalits.  Several of their marches ended in 
violence between Dalits and upper-caste Indians.  The collaboration between Ambedkar's 
Bahishkrut Hitakami Sabha and the Mahad Satyrgraha at this time demonstrates the 
unification of various organizations despite differing tactics.  The end goal of Dalit 
equality remained the same as previous and later waves of the movement.    
 It was not until the Dalit Panthers in 1972 that there was the first glimpse of 
western influence on the way the Dalit movement organized and framed its goals.  This 
western influence on the Dalit movement is very important due to its internationalization 
of movement tactics and frames.  The frame of human rights over civil rights has 
remained effective since the 1970s.  Within the past decade, however, this frame has 
actually fused with other human rights movements at the transnational level.   
 The Panthers originated in Bombay as a militant youth organization without any 
clear leadership.  They were much more radical than previous organizers and had 
connections to other various movements and ideologies such as the Naxalites (Omvedt 
73), a communist movement.  The Dalit Panther manifesto from 1973 states:  
We want the rule of the whole country.  Change of heart, liberal education 
will not end our state of exploitation.  When we gather a revolutionary 
mass, rouse the people, out of the struggle of this giant mass will come the 
tidal wave of revolution...we will build the organization of the workers, 
dalits, landless, poor peasants...we will hit back against all injustice 
perpetrated on dalits.  We will well and truly destroy the caste and varna 
system that thrives on people's misery, which exploits the people, and 
liberate the dalits...Sympathizers and members of the Dalit Panthers, be 
ready for the final struggle of dalits (qtd. in Omvedt 1993). 
 
 The Dalit Panthers witnessed and then utilized the tactics of the Black Panthers 
during the Civil Rights era in the United States.  The Dalit Panthers relied on Malcolm 
X's idea that violence can not be combated with non-violence and instead, only violence 
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stops violence.  The framing strategy of “human rights” over “civil rights” was also taken 
from Malcom X.      
 While the Dalit Panthers still exist they have taken on a softer role, seeking “to 
promote better understanding between castes...a democratic movement which gives voice 
to the people at the bottom rung of society” (Hugo 54).  There are now several smaller 
camps of the movement each with various platforms, some still relying on militancy 
while others promote political organization and lobbying.   
 Today, the Panthers are most popular in the southeastern state of Tamil Nadu with 
a national party, the Liberation Panther's Party, which seeks to promote a regional identity 
over any type of cohesive nationalistic Indian identity.  They still, however, maintain the 
claim that they are guided by Ambedkar.   
 Despite the variety of political parties that have emerged out of the Dalit 
movement, the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) remains the most potentially successful at 
achieving movement goals.  As stated earlier, the BSP was founded in 1984 by Kanshi 
Ram (1934-2006).  Ram created various other organizations throughout the 1970s before 
forming the BSP, including the Backward and Minority Communities Employees' 
Federation (BAMCEF).  Ram was well aware of the more radical Panthers, but instead 
chose to follow the political middle-road of Ambedkar.  Like Ambedkar's Independent 
Labour Party, Ram set the goal of Dalit equality and policy reform.   
 Movement activity stagnated from the early 1980s until about the mid-1990s.  
Very little information can be found about the movement during this period.  Various 
fractions still existed although the radical militancy of the Dalit Panthers lost its 
momentum.  Instead, this period serves as a transition period, moving away from 
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radicalism to more mainstream tactics.  Rajkhowa (2008) states, the 1990s are defined 
“by caste politics.”  This is in part due to the increasing presence of the BSP in state and 
national elections.  Other scholars (Satyanarayana 2003) argue that this period served as a 
culminating point for the influence of Ambedkar, noting, “the stature of Ambedkar” grew 
“with the emergence...of the movement in the 1980s and 1990s” (Sikh Times, June 28 
2003).  The majority of Ambedkar's writings did not become publicly available until this 
period, bringing about a renewed inspiration for the movement.  Satyanarayana continues 
by arguing that during this period “Ambedkar and his work...emerged as an important 
symbol of the Dalit movement and become difficult to ignore.” 
 Although the movement as a whole may have stagnated during this period, it 
should be viewed instead as a period of reinvigoration and reflection.  The renewed 
impact of Ambedkar led not only to the steady growth of the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) 
but also to the formation of many of the Dalit movement organizations that are so 
influential today.  By the late 1990s several of these organizations were transitioning 
from the local to the national and then to the global.  Peter Jay Smith (2008) attributes a 
“more extensive Dalit movement” to the “emergence of a Dalit middle class” in the 
1990s (21).  Smith continues by pointing out that “significant elements of the Dalit 
movement in the 1990s reorganized on a transnational basis” (21).  The 1990s brought 
about increasing access to resources for Dalits and new technologies, such as the Internet, 
that made “going global” easier and faster.    
 The Dalit movement today remains linked with its past.  Most modern Dalit 
organizations claim a connection to the past whether through goals, political affiliations, 
leadership, faith, or inspiration.  Appendix 1 provides a detailed account of some of the 
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most prominent current Dalit social movement organizations (SMOs) and supporting 
information such as their goals, tactics, affiliations, year established, inspirations, 
connections to the transnational sphere and places of operation.  This substantiates the 
claim that despite the variety of Dalit organizations and tactics, the overall goals are 
similar and justify the thought of a unified and singular “Dalit movement.”  While 
organizations may dispute religious views, tactics, political affiliations, and frames they 
remain grounded in the desire for Dalit equality.   
 The contemporary Dalit movement consists of various social movement 
organizations each sharing in the belief of Dalit equality.  Many of these organizations 
overlap, working with other like-minded organizations.  The Dalit movement today is 
multi-faceted.  It includes various and sometimes oppositional groups focusing on 
radicalism and violence, separatism, non-violence, and religious conversion.  These 
groups, however, are linked if by no other way than in their shared belief in Dalit 
equality.   
 For the purposes of this study the National Campaign for Dalit Human Rights 
(NCDHR) organization acts as the face of the Dalit movement.  This decision is based on 
several factors: previous scholarship on NCDHR; accessibility; NCDHR's local 
connections as well as its visibility in the transnational social movement networks 
(visibility in both the local and the global); its growth into an umbrella organization and 
its support by smaller or periphery organizations; and lastly, its goals.  Additionally, 
although NCDHR remains separate from Indian politics and political support, it actively 
supports the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) and recognizes the success of the BSP as a 
victory for the movement.  In particular, it was vocal in the successful election of 
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Mayawati, a female Dalit, to the current Chief Minister position in Uttar Pradesh.    
 The National Campaign for Dalit Human Rights (NCDHR), is a well-known and 
established organization that serves as a “key node” (Smith 2008, 21) to the movement.   
Numerous scholars (Smith 2008; Bob 2007; Thekaekara 2005; Crossette 2000) examine 
the NCDHR as a way to study the larger Dalit movement.  NCDHR claims to be a 
coalition of organizations, activists, journalists, and academics who are trying to end 
discrimination, monitor hate-crimes and bring awareness to the problems of Dalits.  It 
asserts that it is not represented in government positions such as the BSP party.  NCDHR 
has been represented, however, in the 2001 World Conference Against Racism (WCAR), 
all World Social Forums since their inception in 1998, a 40-day Dalit Swadhikar Rally in 
2004, and the first International Conference on the Human Rights of Dalit Women at the 
Hague in 2006 among other national and international events (www.ncdhr.org).    
While the NCDHR does not employ rhetoric that directly challenges Indian 
nationalism, it clearly articulates that India’s status quo needs to transform into a more 
inclusive space.  An overview of scholarship, activities, frames and transnational linkages 
about this organization will be provided later in this chapter.  
 The National Campaign on Dalit Human Rights was created by Martin Macwan, a 
Dalit activist and now lawyer from the state of Gujarat (Crossette 2000).  He was honored 
with the Robert F. Kennedy Human Rights Award in 2000 and was named as one of the 
top five “outstanding human rights defenders around the world” according to Human 
Rights Watch (Crossette 2000).  His involvement in the organization is somewhat vague 
as the NCDHR website does not even mention his name.  Instead the formation of this 
organization is recognized as being created when 78 Dalit activists gathered from across 
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India to discuss the lack of enforcement of the Prevention of Atrocities Act of 1989.  It is 
assumed that Macwan was a part of this gathering.  Currently, Vincent Manoharan is the 
acting National Secretary for the NCDHR.  Upon its inception, the NCDHR is quoted as 
stating (www.ncdhr.org.in): 
We were anguished that though our nation had just completed her 50th year of 
independence, and in spite of our Constitutional and International 
commitments to the contrary, the prevalence of 'untouchability' continued 
unabated in many parts of the country.  In conjunction with the 50th 
anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, we called for an 
urgent national campaign to highlight Dalit Human Rights and to uphold that 
'Dalit Rights are Human Rights.'  
 
Much of the NCDHR's inspiration comes from Dr. B.R. Ambedkar’s ideologies.  The 
NCDHR website claims: “At NCDHR we are both inspired and energized by the teaching 
and intervention of Dr. Ambedkar and find relevant his strategies for the struggles of our 
day.”   
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     Chapter Four 
 
   The National Campaign on Dalit Human Rights  
    
    and the Bahujan Samaj Party  
 
 
   “Our's is a battle not for wealth or for power.   
   It is a battle for freedom.  It is a battle for the  
   reclamation of human personality.”  -Ambedkar 
 
The National Campaign on Dalit Human Rights: Claims, Frames and Connections  
 
 The National Campaign on Dalit Human Rights (NCDHR) was founded in 
1998 with the slogan to “cast out caste.”  This organization utilizes the Internet and 
maintains its website as a vital tool to spread its message, remain connected to its 
affiliates and supporters, and enable transnational networking.  The NCDHR website 
serves as an additional resource for understanding the Dalit struggle but also for 
witnessing its framing strategies, tactics, known affiliates and successes.   
 According to the NCDHR website, the organization has constructed three phases 
which will have taken place before its large-scale goals are accomplished.    
Phase one states that there is an urgent need for “raising visibility.”  The NCDHR 
considers this phase to have been successfully completed, as it notes, “NCHDR has 
managed to successfully raise the visibility of Dalit issues at the state, national and 
international level” (www.ncdhr.org.in).  It provides many reasons for why this phase has 
been completed, including its global activism and participation, especially at the UN 
World Conference Against Racism (WCAR) held in Durban in 2001.   
  52   
 The second phase is “internationalizing Dalit rights.”  For this phase, NCDHR 
states that it has made “major strides in giving visibility to the plight of the Dalit 
community.”  These strides have been made through NCDHR's participation in all World 
Social Forums (WSF), the World Conference Against Racism (WCAR), the 40-day Dalit 
Swadhikar Rally throughout India, “The Situation of the Dalits in India” at the European 
Parliament in Brussels in 2006, and the first International Conference on the Human 
Rights of Dalit Women at The Hague in 2006, the recognition of the problems of Dalit 
Human Rights by the United Nations in August of 2001, recognition by the European 
Union in May of 2007, and lastly, recognition by the United States Congress in July of 
2007.  NCDHR also won the RAFTO award in 2007 for its work at progressing human 
rights.  The NCDHR website does not make declarative statements about the final 
accomplishment of this phase as yet.   
 Eventually, the National Campaign on Dalit Human Rights intends to focus on 
Phase Three, which is “holding states accountable.”  The website states that work on this 
phase began in 2003 with the goals to eradicate the illegal discrimination that occurs on a 
daily basis.  It states:   
We seek foremost to hold the State responsible for not checking the 
'impunity' being enjoyed by non-Dalits in the criminal justice 
administrative system.  Specifically, we challenge the State and its justice 
delivery mechanism, including the Human Rights institutions that are in 
place, to actually implement and enforce its constitutional and legislative 
measures to safeguard, protect and promote the basic human rights of 
Dalits.   
 
The NCDHR uses the Prevention of Atrocities Act of 1989 as a legal grounding for its 
claims.  Peter (Jay) Smith (2008), in “Going Global: The Transnational Politics of the 
Dalit Movement,” brings up the point, which is now emphasized on the new NCDHR 
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website (as of April 2009), that the Dalit movement does not desire to internationalize 
without returning to the state level to seek substantial changes.  Instead, the Dalit 
movement goes global, but also “remains rooted in making the Indian state serve as a 
means of social protection for the Dalit peoples” (Smith 2008, 13).  In fact, the 
internationalization of the movement serves the purpose of Phase One by raising 
visibility beyond the Indian borders.    
 This relationship between the national and the global relates to Ruth Reitan's 
Amended Scale Shift process where a movement builds at the local and national, goes 
international, but then either returns to or is effected by the national (or local).  Appendix 
3 demonstrates the solidarity networks which have emerged out of the Dalit movement 
and distinguishes between the sub-national, the international, and the transnational.  
Among this, it clarifies how the NCDHR works with various levels of the movement and 
transnational networks, but is reflexive as Reitan argues.     
 NCDHR focuses on holding states accountable because though legal intervention 
it hopes to slowly end the discriminatory practices and violence perpetrated towards 
Dalits.   
  The National Campaign on Dalit Human Rights' general objectives is as follows:  
1.  To serve as platform for shared reflection and collective actions for 
AIDMAM, DAAA, NFDLRM and NDMJ. 
2. To extend critical support to Dalit community to realize right to equity and 
justice in the economic, political, cultural, social and gender domains through 
its movements. 
3. To recognize, develop expand initiatives to respond to the larger capacitation 
and public action demands from the Dalits.  
4. To support movements with Dalit ideology, culture, values and work ethics so 
that they can effectively serve as energizers of Dalit public action.  
 
 NCDHR's first objective refers to four “movements” it has started.  AIDMAM is 
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the All India Dalit Mahila Adhikar Manch, a forum for Dalit women to work towards 
altering the double-burden of Dalit females-being Dalits and women.  It seeks to 
challenge the structures that enable discrimination, whether patriarchal, caste or class-
based, or economic.  The DAAA is the Dalit Arthik Adhikar Manch, a branch of the 
NCDHR that focuses on changing the economic and educational practices in India which 
leave Dalits behind while other castes move forward.  The NFDRLM consists of the 
National Federation of Dalit Land Rights Movements.  This organization focuses on Dalit 
access to land and an agricultural livelihood.  Lastly, the NDMJ is the National Dalit 
Movement for Justice, a broader movement within the NCDHR.  It mostly consists of 
Dalit survivors of violence or discrimination as well as sympathizers and seeks to enforce 
justice.  It does so by attempting to, “establish [Dalits] as equal citizens in the society 
under Dalit leadership within our rising consciousness...to promote and protect Civil 
Political Rights of Dalits for ensuring... fair justice” 
(http://www.ncdhr.org.in/ndmj/ndmj).   
 While the National Campaign for Dalit Human Rights only exists in about 14 
Indian states, these smaller branches of the NCDHR operate in additional states.  For 
instance, the National Dalit Movement for Justice (NDMJ) works in about 17 states and 
the National Federation of Dalit Land Rights Movements (NFDLRM) is active in 16 
states.  Some of these organizations even navigate states which do not have a significant 
presence by the National Campaign on Dalit Human Rights, other Dalit movement 
organizations or even the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP).   
 The NCDHR states that its goals are achievable through a variety of strategies.  
The NCDHR website is currently undergoing renovations; these changes from its 
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previous site emphasize its increasing role as an umbrella organization meant to serve and 
strengthen these smaller groups or organizations.  This is reflected in a few of its 
somewhat vague strategies of:   
 1. Form and strengthen movements owned and managed by Dalits  
 2. Develop organizational mechanisms to strengthen the emerging  
    movements 
3. Even while respecting the internal structures of management and control               
    within each member movement, facilitate the internalization and        
    reflection of ideology, values and principles in these movements  
4. Support in Mobilizing adequate resources, knowledge and expertise to   
    further advance vision of the four movements (www.ncdhr.org.in).  
 
NCDHR increasingly frames its goals and strategies in the context of its connections to 
both smaller and larger movements and organizations.  On its home page it now 
emphasizes not only its motto to “cast out caste” and has a photograph of Ambedkar, but 
also provides links to the NCDHR Coalition, One World South Asia, an even larger 
umbrella organization, and has the capability to stream the well-known film among 
activists, academics and sympathizers on the plight of the Dalits- “I'm Dalit. How are 
You?.”  It also provides a link to a recent full-length film, “India Untouched: Stories of a 
People Apart” (2007).  Lastly, it promotes the four sub-movements mentioned earlier and 
a list of recent interventions and daily atrocities.  All of these changes reiterate the 
emphasis on connecting the global and the local.    
  From the Local to the Global: NCDHR's Transnational Ties 
 
 The National Campaign on Dalit Human Rights (NCDHR) continues to expand to 
the transnational sphere where it gains visibility, solidarity, and also increased access to 
resources.  As Charles Tilly (1978) notes, any social movement organization is reliant on 
resources to remain active.  It is due to this need for resources that the movement has 
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historically been driven by Dalits who have access to resources, education, and financial 
capital.  Some Dalit organizations have even expanded to include non-Dalit leadership as 
a means of securing additional resources.  For instance, the BSP has allowed non-Dalit 
politicians to enter into the party as long as the goals remain aligned with the party and 
movement.  The current chairperson of the BSP-Mayawati- however, is a Dalit.   
 The upward direction of the Dalit movement to the global level is what most 
scholars of the movement (Smith 2008; Smith 2005; Bob 2007; Lerche 2008; Paul 2002) 
examine.  This section will provide an overview of relevant scholarship regarding the 
Dalit movement and transnational networking and more specifically, demonstrate the 
process of going global which the National Campaign for Dalit Human Rights has 
enacted.  This will then allow for a sufficient tracing back to the local and national levels 
where election results of the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) are analyzed.   
 Dalit movement participation in the 2001 UN World Conference Against Racism 
in Durban is argued by Dalit scholars (Smith 2008) as the most important moment for the 
movement to the transnational sphere.  This conference brought the issue of casteism to 
an international stage while also providing legitimacy to Dalit movement organizations 
such as the NCDHR.  It was at this moment that Dalit organizations began to reframe 
their strategies and language to enable solidarity among other excluded groups.  Smith 
(2008) also points out that the NCDHR “took a significant step in transnationalizing the 
Dalit struggle” by aiding in the formation of the Denmark-based International Dalit 
Solidarity Network (IDSN) in 2001.  Appendix 3 demonstrates the transnational 
networking of the NCDHR both to the smaller local organizations and the much larger 
global organizations which either focus on Dalit rights or support Dalit right.  Appendix 1 
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also lists the INSN in order to demonstrate its goals and tactics in comparison with other 
organizations.  The Dalit movement has support from groups across the globe, including 
religious, minority, human rights, anti-slavery and anti-discrimination groups.  NCDHR 
has even recently been involved with the Landless Workers' movement in Brazil.    
 Before the Dalit movement attended the 2001 UN World Conference Against 
Racism (WCAR) it experienced other successes which are likely attributed to increasing 
interconnections between regions and movements.  In fact, Peter Jay Smith (2008) points 
all the way back to the immigration of Dalits to Europe as the beginnings of the 
“internationalization of the Dalit issue” (21).  The internationalization of the Dalit 
movement is not under contention here.  Instead, the year of 2001 is used as the moment 
of transnationalization.  The NCDHR participated in the World Social Forum (WSF) in 
Porto Alegre in 2001 as well.  
 Other organizations, however, were already monitoring the plight of the Dalits.   
 For instance, Human Rights Watch was studying and exposing casteism in India years 
prior to 2001.  It published Broken People: Caste Violence Against India's 
“Untouchables” in 1999.  This book includes recommendations to the government of 
India, all state governments, the United Nations, World Bank and other international 
lending institutions, and India's donors and trading partners.  It examines in very precise 
detail forms of discrimination in specific regions and instances, as well as outlines the 
failures of India and Indian states to meet domestic and international legal obligations.  
The work was conducted in 1998 with over 300 interviews of Dalit men and women.  
Human Rights Watch also met with government officials, activists, and other people 
involved on either side of the movement.  NCDHR relies on many of the facts from this 
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book to support its claims.     
 The Human Rights Watch report does not conclude with positive outcomes.  
Regarding politics, it only discusses how local, state, and/or national governments handle 
or ignore blatant acts of discrimination and violence.    For the purposes of this research, 
the HRW report successfully provides the context for the persistence of discrimination in 
India.  In 2007 another Human Rights Watch report came out: Human Rights Watch 
Report: Hidden Apartheid: Caste Discrimination Against India’s “Untouchables.”  These 
reports by Human Rights Watch jump-started the internationalization of both the Dalit 
cause and movement.  Like the movement's participation in the 2001 World Conference 
Against Racism, the reports also provided the necessary legitimacy for the National 
Campaign on Dalit Human Rights (NCDHR) to expand to the global sphere.     
 Peter Jay Smith (2008), in his article, “Going Global: The Transnational Politics 
of the Dalit Movement,” analyzes the National Campaign for Dalit Human Rights' 
(NCDHR) participation in the 2004 World Social Forum held in Mumbai.  He attended 
the 2004 WSF in Mumbai as well as the 2005 and 2007 forums (15).  He attained 
interviews with various Dalit leaders, subscribed to Dalit forums, and examined various 
primary and secondary literatures on the Dalit movement.  Smith connects the Dalit 
movement to the larger opposition against neo-liberal globalization and policy (14), 
stating, “while globalization may disempower people, it may simultaneously empower 
the most marginalized groups who increasingly are acquiring the capacity to project 
themselves and their causes beyond their borders, in this instance, the Dalits” (14).    
 While Smith's approach is somewhat different from my own, focusing on 
economic policy and the Global Justice movement, his scholarship is the most pertinent 
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to my own examination of the Dalit movement for several reasons.  Smith relies on a case 
study methodology and employs Ruth Reitan's (2007) use of “understanding” and 
“explanation”, the subjective and objective.  These concepts, covered earlier in this 
thesis, are a part of her methodology leading to the Amended Scale Shift Model.   Smith 
uses Held's (1999) definition of globalization as way to place himself within relevant 
scholarship.  He also emphasizes the importance of space for the movement and 
NCDHR's primary objective of “making the Indian state better serve the interests of the 
Dalit people” (15).  Although Smith focuses on the transnational level of movement 
activity, he successfully argues for the goal of the movement to return to the local and 
national levels.  Lastly, as this is an exploratory case study, Smith's fieldwork provides a 
useful first-hand account of NCDHR and its path to the global.       
 Regarding Dalit organizations going beyond India, Smith asserts, “they widened 
the basis of their struggle against caste and shifted scales beyond the nation-state, a 
struggle very much premised on the ideas of Ambedkar.  Yet, at the same time...the Dalits 
insisted that the state retain its key role in terms of social protection and improvement” 
(21).  In fact, in one interview a Dalit activist links this path to Ambedkar, noting, 
“Ambedkar showed that boundaries for solutions to the problem of caste discrimination 
are not to be drawn around the village, district, state or nation.  What is an internal 
solution or external solution should not be determined by geographic borders or national 
borders” (21).  Smith also argues that Dalits are more nationalistic perhaps, since their 
“primary objective [is in] making the Indian state better” (15).   
 According to Smith, the Dalit movement during the 1990s shifted its focus to the 
transnational level due to increased frustration with neoliberalism.  He states, “they 
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widened the basis of their struggle against caste and shifted scales beyond the nation-
state...yet, at the same time...Dalits insisted that the state retain its key role in terms of 
social protection and improvement” (21).  He concludes that “real change” is possible in 
modern India although it has not been fully realized as of yet.   
 Clifford Bob (2007), in “'Dalit Rights are Human Rights': Caste Discrimination, 
International Activism, and the Construction of a New Human Rights Issue,” argues the 
Dalits have achieved “limited but important advances among transnational NGOs, 
international organizations and foreign governments since the late 1990s” (167).  He 
points to organizational and rhetorical factors as to why the Dalits are increasingly 
successful at gaining recognition for their cause. Bob continues by asserting that this is 
due to the movement's unified network within India (as can be seen in the National 
Campaign on Dalit Human Rights) but then also outside of India.  Bob points to changes 
in framing strategies- a broader framing away from casteism to a more readily familiar 
terminology of human rights, discrimination and exclusion (168).  This allows the Dalits 
to connect with a variety of other minority groups such as the Burakumin of Japan, a 
minority group, and the landless workers of South America.         
 Jens Lerche (2008), in “Transnational Advocacy Networks and Affirmative Action 
for Dalits in India,” comments: “strategy matters” (239).  Lerche, too, argues that the 
shift of grassroots organizations to a more unified coalition has made them more 
successful than previous organization.  He states, the Dalit movement “uses transnational 
advocacy networks to generate international social and political pressure on the Indian 
government, in order to further its own agenda at a national level” (240).  A key strategy 
of the modern Dalit movement is just this: the reframing of the cause to succinctly match 
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that of other human rights organizations.  “Casting out caste” is still important, but so too 
is the understanding that “dalit rights are human rights” (NCDHR).  NCDHR also 
believes in the motto of the World Social Forum- “another world is possible.” 
 Lastly, Nicolas Jaoul’s chapter, “Political and ‘Non-Political’ Means in the Dalit 
Movement,” links the movement and the BSP to both political and non-political or socio-
cultural tactics.  This article is crucial to this thesis because it synthesizes the Dalit 
movement and its connections to the BSP, the local and the transnational.  Jaoul writes, 
“with the rise to power by the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) in Uttar Pradesh (UP), it has 
been widely acknowledged that Dalits have improved their position in the local power 
structures” (191).  He connects the success of the BSP to the success of the Dalit 
movement and inclusivity.  Jaoul, however, is hesitant to focus on the political route of a 
social movement, noting “the attaining of political power is acknowledged as an essential 
step, but also regarded as a potential trap for an authentic people’s movement” (191).  He 
is critical of BSP officials once they are elected into office and the ways in which they 
interact with the movement and UP citizens; Jaoul states, “the cynical behavior of the 
BSP elected representatives towards their electorate has exacerbated the popular 
suspicion of politicians and the political sphere as a whole” (214).  Jaoul’s statement 
clarifies why the NCDHR and other organizations opt not to officially affiliate 
themselves with a political party and choose instead, to support individual candidates.   
 The Dalit movement does not directly make claims about challenging Indian 
nationalism but rather attempts to assert an Ambedkar philosophy of equality on the basis 
of human rights and Indian citizen rights.  The contestation of Dalits against Hindu 
nationalism is supported by most Dalit-scholars.  Gail Omvedt is a sociologist and 
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scholar-activist who has been a part of the Dalit movement since the 1970s.  Her writings 
focus on her personal knowledge of the movement and its history.  In her book, Dalit 
Visions (2006), she states that the movements “came to contest the way in which the 
Hindu-nationalist forces sought to depict and hegemonize Indian culture” (6).  Omvedt 
continues by pointing out three themes in Dalit politics:  challenging the very definition 
of Hinduism as the core of Indian tradition and the necessity for this powerful force to be 
overthrown; support for all marginalized or oppressed people in India; and the need for 
cultural, economic and political change in India (86-7).   
 Omvedt, like other scholars (Bob 2007; Smith 2008; Paul 2002) note that the 
movement has not as yet achieved its primary goal of Dalit equality.  Of course, pockets 
of both equality and severe discrimination exist today, typically aligned with the 
urban/rural divide.  It is also noteworthy that the BSP like the movement has evolved its 
goals to be more moderate and universal, fostering a “broader vision which could make it 
a leader of a mass upsurge” (Omvedt 91).  Other researchers have presented evidence to 
suggest that NCDHR's participation in transnational meetings has contributed to its 
ability to successfully achieve its goals of inclusion to both the Indian place and the 
global space.   
The Indian Political Sphere: Dalits, Politics and the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) 
 The Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) was founded in 1984 as a Dalit-based political 
party with the goals of addressing the needs of the excluded and oppressed Dalit 
population (Pai 2002).  The BSP philosophy is inspired by B.R. Ambedkar, who was a 
Dalit political leader in the early and mid-20th century.  It was founded, however, by 
Kanshi Ram, a Dalit-Sikh.  He grew up in the northwestern rural state of Punjab and was 
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the only child to graduate school.  He claims to not have experienced any 
“untouchability,” or Dalit-based discrimination, until working for the government where 
the celebration of Dr. Ambedkar's birthday was disputed.  This experience and the 
reading of Ambedkar's work inspired Ram to take up Dalit rights in the early 1970s, 
founding the Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, Other Backward Classes and 
Minorities Employees Welfare Association in 1971.  By 1973 the organization became 
the All India Backward and Minority Employees Federation (BAMCEF).   
 Ram's goals initially focused on radical social transformation, the BAMCEF 
motto being, “Educate, Organize and Agitate.”  His focus, however, slowly shifted away 
from community organizing and into politics with the goal of placing Dalits (or Dalit-
rights sympathizers) into elected office.  Thus, the BSP was born with this amended goal 
of successful social change through political power.   
 The BSP is currently listed as a national party in India, but even within the last 
decade has either not been present in certain Indian states or run as a state party.    
This is most likely due to Dalit movement activity within some states and not others.  
Sudha Pai (2002), in Dalit Assertion and the Unfinished Democratic Revolution: The 
Bahujan Samaj Party in Uttar Pradesh, claims that “the gradual emergence of Dalit 
consciousness and movements was significant feature of colonial India...leading to [the] 
uneven development of the Dalit movement” (25).  Pai continues by asserting that that 
the socio-political roots of the BSP rest in India's colonial past.   
 Scholars (Luce 2007; Omvedt 2006; Pai 2002) claim that the emerging status of 
the BSP as a legitimate, established party is due to the Dalit consciousness movements 
beginning in the colonial period, especially the influence of Ambedkar, and the over 30 
  64   
years of post-independence before the establishment of the BSP.  The party is firmly 
rooted in the identity politics of Dalits although it allows non-Dalit participation.  In fact, 
in the January 21st, 2009 edition of The Hindu news a well-known BJP official, Kalyan 
Singh, former Uttar Pradesh Chief Minister, stepped down from the party to instead back 
the BSP.  Singh is quoted as saying, "We will take up the cause of Dalits, backwards, 
farmers and downtrodden in the days to come” 
(www.hindu.com/thehindu/holnus/000200901211431.htm).  Some critics, however, claim 
that Singh may be doing this due to the increasing popularity of the BSP in Uttar Pradesh 
whose supporters could potentially back him in a run for Prime Minister.   
 Because the BSP is the party primarily supported by the Dalit movement, it will 
be imperative to explore how BSP support varies across regions in India and across time 
as the movement shifts from being locally and nationally to transnationally networked.  
Scholars remark that although the movement is making significant strides it is still not at 
a point of completion.   Pai (2002) states, the BSP has “failed in its avowed goal of 
displacing manuvadi (representing upper castes) forces and introducing social change” 
(1).  The author argues that the BSP is at a cross-road and must decide between remaining 
loyal to its revolutionary leftist roots or to push forward as a political party “driven solely 
by the compulsion of achieving power” (1).   
Yet, the overall goals of the BSP remain rooted within the movement and 
Ambedkar's vision for Dalits in India.  It strives for justice and equality as is stated in the 
Indian Constitution (bspindia.org).  The BSP states on its website:  
The chief aim and objective of the party shall be to work as a 
revolutionary social and economic movement of change with a view to 
realise, in practical terms, the supreme principles of universal justice, 
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liberty, equality and fraternity enunciated in the Constitution of India, to be 
followed by State in governance, and in particular summed up in the 
following extract from the Preamble of the Constitution.   
 
Mayawati is the key leader of the movement and acts as unifier of politics and social 
activism, similar to how Ambedkar served the movement.  She is often cited as a 
potential future Prime Minister of India.     
 Prior to the 2001 World Conference Against Racism Dalits were relatively 
successful in the Indian political sphere.  Pockets of support for the BSP before the pre-
global period are most recognized in the central state of Uttar Pradesh (UP).  The data 
collected in this project reinforces this and is expanded on in Chapter Five.  Long before 
this research, however, scholars have analyzed the success of the BSP, most notably in 
Uttar Pradesh.   
 A few articles and books (Pai 2002; The Economist 3/15/2003 and 5/26/2007; 
Jaffrelot 1998) have already been written on this BSP in Uttar Pradesh.  Other articles 
highlight the oppositional dichotomy that exists between the BSP and the Hindu 
nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP).  An article titled, “Saffron Fading: The Hindu 
Nationalists are struggling for leadership and direction,” appeared in The Economist 
(May 26, 2007).  It declares that “Indians are out-of-love with dynastic politics” and 
connects this 2007 UP election to the 2004 loss of the general election by the BJP.  The 
article notes, however, that the party does still hold power although its message has 
softened in order to have more appeal.  Another Economist article (March 1, 2008), 
“Beginning the Long Goodbye,” also comments on the decline of the BJP.  It claims that 
they have been “demoralized” and has “been torn by feuding over its Hindu-elitist 
ideology.”   
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The BSP, on the other hand, has had a “rise [that] has been inexorable.”  This is 
most apparent in the victory of Mayawati, a female Dalit and BSP chairperson, who was 
elected chief minister in Uttar Pradesh for the fourth time in the May 2007 election. 
 Mayawati is known as “the Dalit queen” and was a former protégé of Kanshi 
Ram, the founder of the BSP.  Simon Robinson, in an article for the Time Magazine 
(South Pacific Edition, April 14, 2008), cites Mayawati as “emerging as a national power 
broker--and even a potential Prime Minister.” Radhika Govinda, in “The Politics of the 
Marginalized: Dalits and Women's Activism in India” considers Mayawati and the BSP's 
success as uplifting for the Dalit movement in general.  Govinda writes, “the BSP's 
emergence as a strong regional party under the leadership of Mayawati has led to a 
significant rise in confidence within Dalit communities” (183).  She goes on to note as 
these Dalit political successes happen or increase so too do attacks on Dalits by upper-
caste men and women (183).   
 Mayawati has also been working towards enforcing the previous Indian and 
international policies against discrimination and ensuring that the affirmative action 
policies are also enforced.  Sagarika Ghose (2007) mentions how Mayawati had a leader 
of a political union, the Bharatiya Kisan Union, arrested for making a “casteist” 
comment.  Overall, it is clear that Mayawati is a symbolic icon for the future of Dalits in 
India.  Her name has spread to the international media, even being recently written about 
in the Los Angeles Times (Chu 2008).  This is not to ignore, however, the many 
controversies that surround her such as accusations of corruption, embezzlement, and 
altering the original goals of the BSP to include other caste politicians and leaders.  Yet, 
as she most recently publicized, not much is changing in more traditional Indian political 
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parties.  She attacked Congress General Secretary, Rahul Gandhi, most recently for 
attempting to appeal to Dalits in UP while in private conducting ritual purification after 
interacting with Dalits, whose vote he is after for the upcoming 2009 election 
(www.mynews.in).   
 Even though political successes have been shown, there is not enough evidence to 
say that Dalits have conclusively “achieved” success. Rather, the BSP continues to gain 
mainstream popularity in certain regions of India while remaining virtually unknown 
(and unelected) in other areas.  There is hope for the BSP with the projection of 
Mayawati as the potential next Prime Minister.  This will eventually trickle down to the 
160 million Dalits living in India.  Likewise, the National Campaign of Dalit Human 
Rights continues its transnational networking while remaining grounded in the communal 
and political needs of Dalits in India.     
 Sam Paul (2002), in “Dalits, Durban and Delhi...Now What?,” argues that the 
“mindset of the masses must be influenced” for any sort of radical change to occur (149).  
He also remarks that “the real plight of the Dalits in our towns and villages will not be 
affected much even in a post-Durban scenario...atrocities against Dalits remain the same.  
They must live in separate settlements, draw water from separate pumps or wells, refrain 
from entering temples, and refrain from dining with the upper castes with separate places 
to sit” (149).  He even provides measures which he thinks will be helpful. It is also 
somewhat interesting when reading his biography to notice that he is a writer from the All 
India Christian Council.  Religions typically support the Dalit cause if for no other reason 
then they seek new membership.  One of his measures for adoption is no surprise: the 
mass conversion of Dalits to Christianity.   
  68   
 Other scholars agree, however; Gopal Guru (2004) considers Dalits to still remain 
“bahishkrut,” which is noted as translating to “outcastes, ostracized, ghettoized, and 
socially boycotted” (757).  Guru's article, “Dalit Vision of India: from Bahishkrut to 
Inclusive Bharat,”  supports the earlier argument of Dalits as the future protectors of the 
Indian nation, as it is stated, “Their responsibility as the defender of Indian nation has 
increased manifold because the upper castes have a shaky commitment to the Indian 
nation” (762).  This is because many Dalits do not, as of yet, have access to the global 
market.   
 Guru's final claim is one of hope: “the final future project of the Dalits would be 
to detoxify the civil society of its deep-seated prejudices and the structures of humiliation 
that push Dalits into the siege.” Guru continues, “the Dalits will prefer that kind of India, 
which will not produce the structures that will underlie and renew the structures of 
inequality” (762-3).    
 While the Dalit movement has evolved over time as a means to acquire new skills, 
tactics, and relationships, its overall goals have remained grounded in the task of created 
a new India that correlates its policy of equality with what Dalits and lower castes 
actually experience.  The BSP, while historically rooted in the Dalit movement, has 
sought to achieve success not only from below but also from above by gaining political 
power.  Christophe Jaffrelot (1998) points out that this is not, however, different from 
what other Dalit organizations have sought to do throughout history, particularly 
Ambedkar (35).  Kanshi Ram, the founder of the BSP, was in fact very much a part of the 
movement and, like most Dalit organizations, took his inspiration from Dr. B.R. 
Ambedkar.   
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     Chapter Five 
   Data, Findings, and Future Research   
 
    State Electoral Results Data 
 It is now necessary to turn to the electoral results of the Dalit-based Bahujan 
Samaj Party.  Although a comparison has been done between the BJP and BSP, the results 
of the BSP alone are of interest.  Individual state data and corresponding electoral data 
table may be found in Appendix 2.  This includes the state's population, its literacy rate, 
its urban/rural division, and Dalit movement presence gathered in part from the 2001 
census (India.gov.in).    The electoral results for both the BSP and BJP are indicated in a 
table per state.  Each table presents the year of the election, how many seats the BJP 
contested, how many seats they actually won, how many seats the BSP contested, how 
many they won, and the total winning party for the election.  Before getting started, Table 
2 provides a list of common political parties, their abbreviations, and is followed by a 
brief summary of the most common national Indian political parties.   
    Table 2: Common Political Parties            
 
  
 
Common Political Party Abbreviations: 
        BSP                    Bahujan Samaj Party 
        BJP                     Bharatiya Janata Party 
        INC                     Indian National Congress 
        CPI                     Communist Party of India 
        CPM                   Communist Party of India    
                                    (Marxist) 
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The Indian National Congress (INC) was founded in 1885 and was the main party 
which became a part of the Indian Independence movement fighting against colonial rule.  
Currently, the INC claims to be the only party “anchored in the larger vision of India as a 
nation, while at the same time being sensitive to regional and local sentiments”  
(www.congress.org.in).  The INC has roots in the beliefs of Mahatma Gandhi, especially 
the concept of Sarvodaya which is to help uplift all segments of the Indian population.  In 
the 2009 Lok Sabha elections the INC along with a coalition of other parties, the United 
Progressive Alliance, came to power. 
 The Communist Party of India and then the splinter-party, the Communist Party of 
India (Marxist) are both communist parties with limited success in Indian states-Kerala 
and Tamil Nadu.  The CPI claims to be the party of the “Indian working class” 
(www.cpiindia.org).  It seeks justice through a socialist regime where all citizens have an 
equal opportunity.  The CPI was founded in 1925.  The CPI(M) split with the CPI around 
1964 due to the desire to continue with radical tactics whereas the CPI has softened its 
message.   
 Indian political parties are divided by either state or national standing.  Some 
state-based parties, such as the Jammu & Kashmir National Conference, have 
successfully won state general assembly elections and coalitions in the national 
government.  Much of India’s political party structure consists of numerous small and 
regional parties.  As of 2004, there were only 9 national parties and about 50 recognized 
state parties (eci website).    
 Data for this project were gathered from 16 states.  Out of those states, the number 
of seats contested and/or won by the BSP increased from the pre-global to post- periods.  
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It is noteworthy that out of the 16 states that data were successfully collected from, a 
NCDHR branch exists in 12 of them.  Once factoring the sub-movements of the National 
Campaign on Dalit Human Rights only Jammu & Kashmir has no known Dalit 
movement presence.  This information, along with other Dalit movement activity, is 
outlined in Appendix 1.   
Table 3 (below) provides a list of Indian states, the states where data were 
collected, and whether or not findings were conclusive or inconclusive.   Inconclusive 
data are determined by a lack of BSP participation in a given state.  Three states- 
Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, and Uttarakhand- were not formed as states until 2000; 
therefore, they were not used in data collection as they did not have viable elections to 
establish a pre-global period.  Table 3 also provides a summary of each state’s political 
activity-which party won and changes in both contested and won seats by the BSP.  
Table 3 highlights several important outcomes.  First, there are drastic rises in the 
seats contested by BSP candidates in every state where data were collected.  This, 
however, does not necessarily translate to more elected positions in those states.  In fact, 
in two states- Punjab and Jammu & Kashmir- the BSP elected positions decreased.  There 
continues to be a rather low “success” rate of BSP candidates achieving elected positions.  
The remainder of the data provided in Table 3 and in Appendix 2 will be analyzed in 
more detail shortly.  Before that, however, the data and results of Uttar Pradesh’s political 
landscape are examined more closely because, as previously discussed, this state has 
unusual BSP success compared with the rest of the states under review. 
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Table 3:  Electoral Data Collected  
State:  Pre-Global 
Election: 
1995-1999 
Post-
Global 
Election:   
2002-2009 
Inconclusive BSP Changes 
from Pre- to 
Post 
Contestations
BSP Changes  
From Pre- to 
Post 
Wins 
Winning Party 
from Pre- to 
Post- Periods 
Andhra 
Pradesh 
1999 2004  48 to 160 0 to 1 BJP to INC 
Arunachal 
Pradesh 
1999 2004 X             
Assam 1996 2006 X             
Bihar 1995 2005  161 to 212 2 to 4 JD to BJP 
Goa 1999 2002, 2007 X             
Gujarat 1998 2002, 2007  7 to 166 0  BJP 
Haryana 1996 2005  67 to 84 0 to 1 BJP to INC 
Himachal 
Pradesh 
1998 2003, 2007  28 to 67 0 to 1 INC to BJP 
Jammu & 
Kashmir 
1996 2002, 2008  29 to 83 4 to 0 JKN 
Karnataka 1999 2004  85 to 102 0 INC 
Kerala 1996 2006  12 to 107 0 CPI to CPI(M) 
Madhya 
Pradesh 
1998 2003, 2008  170 to 228 11  INC to BJP 
Maharashtra 1999 2004  83 to 272 0 BJP to INC 
Manipur 1995 2002, 2007 X             
Meghalaya 1998 2003, 2008 X             
Mizoram 1998 2003, 2008 X             
Nagaland 1998 2003, 2008 X             
Orissa 1995 2004  59 to 86 0 INC to BJP 
Punjab 1997 2002, 2007  67 to 115 1 to 0 BJP  
Rajasthan 1998 2003, 2008  108 to 199 2 to 6 INC 
Sikkim 1999 2004 X             
Tamil Nadu 1996 2006  9 to 164 0 CPI to INC 
Tripura 1998 2003, 2008 X             
Uttar 
Pradesh 
1996 2002, 2007  296 to 403 67 to 206 BJP to BSP 
West Bengal 1996 2006  48 to 128 0 CPM 
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 One clear avenue of future research is fieldwork to see exactly why the BSP has 
such a tremendous success rate in UP.  Scholars have written about the politics in UP 
without covering the tactics of both the local and state level Dalit movement and BSP 
offices.  The political activity in Uttar Pradesh since the mid-1990s is of particular 
interest to this research project.  As has already been alluded to, it is the only state to have 
an overwhelming BSP majority and a Dalit Chief Minister, Mayawati.  The NCDHR has 
maintained a significant presence in Uttar Pradesh along with numerous other Dalit 
organizations, but no research points to a heightened level of mobilization or even 
movement-party organization.    
The BSP, although somewhat successful in the 1990s, drastically increased both 
its candidates contesting seats and elected officials between 1996 and 2007.  In 2007 it 
took the lead as the winning party across the state.         
In 1996 the BSP challenged 296    Table 4: Uttar Pradesh Data 
positions and was elected to 67 of  
those seats.  In 2007 its numbers 
grew significantly to 403 contested 
seats and 206 elected positions.  At 
table 4 demonstrates, the BJP 
dropped both its contestation and elected positions between 1996 and 2007.  In 1996 it 
ran for 404 seats and was elected to 174 of those positions whereas in 2007 it contested 
350 seats and only won 51 positions. 
Bahujan Samaj Party presence will need to continue to be monitored over time to 
see if its political power continues, grows, or decreases.  There are several possible 
State:                   Uttar Pradesh
1996 2002 2007
BJP Contested Seats: 414 320 350
BJP Wins: 174 88 51
BSP Contested Seats: 296 401 403
BSP Wins: 67 98 206
Winning Party: BJP BJP BSP
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factors for BSP success: UP is the most populated state, with a population of 166,052,859 
(2001 census).  Also, while it is comprised of about 66% rural land, it has slightly below 
double the national average of population density.  It is rated at approximately 473 people 
per square kilometer while the national average is at 274 people.  UP has a 57.36% 
literacy rate.   
As discussed earlier, the role of Mayawati in state and national elections has been 
and will continue to be very important not only for Uttar Pradesh but also for the Dalit 
cause and the Bahujan Samaj Party.  She is, according to various news sources, the first 
Dalit who has a real chance of someday becoming the Prime Minister of India.  In fact, 
there was speculation about this during the most recent general elections in India-the 15th 
Lok Sabha elections.     
    2009 Lok Sabha Elections 
 Into this discussion of Uttar Pradesh must enter the 15th general Lok Sabha 
elections (April).  The data gathered for this study were compiled from the state-by state 
general assembly elections, particularly the Vidhan Sabha (lower house).  This was done 
so because the upper houses do not have an electoral process by the people but rather, 
through appointment.  The Lok Sabha is also a lower house on the national level.  It is the 
“House of the People” and, like the Vidhan Sabha, allows for elections by the citizens.  
The majority of this research was accomplished prior to the April 2009 Lok Sabha 
elections.  These elections, however, are very important to this research project.  
Therefore, an overview of the most recent electoral data will be presented in this chapter.   
 The media heavily covered the BSP and the role of Mayawati, the chief minister 
of UP.  Although Mayawati was not expecting the Prime Minister position in this series of 
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elections, various news stories emphasized her future candidacy.  Chandra (April 16th, 
2009) for Indian Express writes, “the significance of Mayawati as a potential prime 
minister is not just that she happens to be Dalit — but that she has built a mass political 
base by openly presenting herself as being of and for Dalits” (www.indiaexpress.com).    
 Coverage of Mayawati's chances as a Prime Minister is not restricted to India.  On 
April 14th, 2009 National Public Radio published the following article on its website, 
“'Untouchable' seeks power in Indian election.”  This was followed by a radio news story 
on April 15th, 2009 regarding the general elections.  The NPR article asks regarding 
Mayawati, “But can she become prime minister?” 
It continues,  
She certainly has a chance. While national politics have long been 
dominated by two parties — the left-of-center Congress and the Hindu 
nationalist BJP —neither is expected to be able to form a strong coalition. 
This has given regional and caste-based parties — particularly Mayawati's 
— additional power as they negotiate to join alliances that will form after 
the five phases of voting end May 13. 
The findings of this research project accompanied by scholarly and non-scholarly 
literature make one claim clear- Indian politics and the Bahujan Samaj Party's function 
within it should continue to be followed.   
 Once the elections were over several media outlets wrote about the devastating 
results for the Bahujan Samaj Party.  Article titles include: “Stung by Defeat, Mayawati to 
revert to Dalit Agenda,” “Maya fails to cast a spell,” and “Dalit movement takes a 
Beating.”  There was an unprecedented and perhaps unwarranted amount of hype 
regarding an anticipated BSP-alliance landslide win.  Therefore, when the BSP did not 
live up to this performance, the media took the approach of the BSP being “defeated,” 
“beaten,” or “failing to cast a spell.”  The India Election Commission put out a table 
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stating the electoral results: 
  Indian National Congress (INC): 206 
  Other State Parties (OTH):   167 
  Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP): 116 
  Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP):    21 
 The BSP when compared to either the INC or BJP does not fare well.  But, the 
BSP is not yet on the same mainstream level, whether ideologically, socially or 
politically, as either the BJP or INC.  Although it continues to increase its presence in 
states, it is not an old enough party to make leaps into the winning party of India.  Just as 
Dalit rights are not yet a mainstream concern across India, neither is the Bahujan Samaj 
Party.   
 A brief glance at the results of both the 13th and 14th Lok Sabha elections 
demonstrate that despite media coverage, the BSP has, in fact, increased its elected seats 
in the Lok Sabha.  The BSP won 14 seats in the 13th Lok Sabha elections (1999) and won 
19 seats in the 14th Lok Sabha elections (2004).  During the 15th Lok Sabha elections the 
BSP won 21 seats.   
This is not a drastic increase; the BSP is not suddenly over-powering the Indian 
National Congress or Bharatiya Janata Party.  Yet, this study is not looking for obvious 
success or even drastic changes in the Indian social conscious or political landscape.  As 
an exploratory case study, this project instead seeks to see if this area of research is 
relevant and in need of future research.    
Findings and Conclusions  
What does this mean for the Dalit movement and what are the larger implications 
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for nationalism in India?  Currently, the BSP remains focused on Dalit and low caste 
rights.  As political power is ascertained this may change in which case the movement 
may react against the party.  Vikram Garg, a PhD student studying caste politics, is 
quoted in an article by Ghimire for The Global Voice as saying, “that despite all efforts 
made to empower the dalits, their situation still remains dire” 
(www.globalvoicesonline.org).  This sentiment is reflected in the statements of human 
rights organizations and the National Campaign on Dalit Human Rights.  The NCDHR 
states that it has accomplished the goal of internationalizing and spreading its cause.  This 
can potentially connect to the drastic changes in BSP candidates across the states under 
review.  Yet, the NCDHR recognizes that it has not yet successfully returned to the state 
level where it seeks to hold states accountable for discriminatory practices; hence, BSP 
candidates are not typically elected.  Calls for changes to the traditional national ideology 
have not changed enough yet to allow for wide-spread BSP political power.   
Since this project does not handle primary research in India, it is hard to make a 
connection between what the BSP does in India, what the lived reality of Dalits is, and 
how the two interact.  The data presented above is a start for understanding the political 
landscape of India and how the BSP fits into it.  Much work still needs to be done and 
additional data would provide more support for what the data seeks to determine- 
whether or not going global increases the chances of successfully challenging 
nationalism.  While these elections may not provide a direct link to the inner-workings 
and success of the Dalit movement, it is achieving the goals set forth by the project as an 
exploratory case study.  
 Comparing electoral results from 1995-1999 and 2002-2009 does not provide a 
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unmistakable relationship between the Dalit movement's participation in the transnational 
sphere, the Bahujan Samaj Party's success in the domestic sphere, or the contestation of 
Hindu nationalism as represented in the Bharatiya Janata Party.  This path of “going 
global,” however, should be viewed as one possible reason for the changes in BSP 
success.  An interpretation of the data reinforces several points: visibility for the Dalit 
cause has increased and most likely will continue along this path.  Also, there are 
noticeable small changes to the success rate of the BSP in gaining elected positions.  The 
state general assembly elections and the 2009 Lok Sabha elections both support this 
claim.      
The NCDHR asserts that the goal of internationalizing the plight of the Dalits has 
been achieved due to its participation and attention from numerous global entities.  
Regarding the collected data, overall the BSP contested only 1,277 seats between the 16 
states reviewed in the pre-global period (1995-1999).  Out of those contested seats it won 
87.  This is only a 6.81% success rate.  In the post-global participation period the BSP 
contested 2,576 seats, winning 230 of those.  This is a success rate of 8.93% and more 
than a 50% increase in both contested and won seats.   
 The BJP, on the other hand, ran for 2,591 seats overall in the 1995-1999 period.  It 
won 674 of those seats throughout the various Indian states.  In the 2002-2009 period it 
decreased the number of seats it contested running for 2,089; it increased, however, its 
elected seats to 684.  This is a jump from a 26% success rate in the pre-global period to a 
32.74% success rate in the post- period.  Table 5 demonstrates these total changes in the 
BSP and BJP between the pre- and post- periods. 
Thus, the rate of success for both the Dalit-based BSP and the Hindu nationalist 
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BJP has increased in recent years.  Yet, the number of seats contested has drastically 
increased for the BSP and sharply decreased for the BJP.  Several scholars have pointed 
to the increasing fragmentation of large, stable political parties in India.  This was 
actually one of the predictions for the 2009 Lok Sabha elections-that it would be 
dominated by alliances between the small regional parties instead of one of the large 
national parties.  The BSP was not expected to gain a majority on its own, but instead 
would be a part of a much larger coalition.  
   Table 5: Total Changes in the BSP and BJP 
   
The BJP is among one of these parties that were expected not to fare well; and yet, 
although it decreased the number of seats it ran for it maintained and increased its elected 
positions in numerous states.  The heightened success of both parties alludes to the fact 
that the voter-base of each may not be leaving one for the other.  There is not an either-or 
  80   
division between the BSP and BJP; rather, the voter base is drastically different and it 
seems more likely that voters would be pulled from the more moderate Indian National 
Congress or vice-versa.  This project did not expect that there was a clear oppositional 
relationship between the BSP and BJP.  Since, however, the BJP is the most closely 
linked party to Hindu nationalism it was helpful to also monitor what was going on with 
its party.  Perhaps, the BSP has gained recent voters that were not voting previously; the 
Dalit movement mentioned that it sponsors voter registration campaigns in rural and poor 
villages.   
Future research needs to examine the specific relationship between the BSP, BJP 
and other political parties to study how the Indian nation has adequate space for several 
to succeed.  The BJP has slightly decreased its numbers but remains stable and powerful.  
The Indian National Congress has become more popular which may be due to their 
sympathetic message to uplift all the segments of Indian society.  And, as the NCDHR 
publicizes its cause the BSP also continues to grow.  How the ideology of each party 
resonates with the voter-base Indian identity is also of interest.   
 Analysis of individual states potentially offers a more direct correlation between 
the Dalit movement and Hindu nationalism as recognized in the BSP and BJP.  Table 6 
(below) illustrates the changes between the BSP and BJP in the state of Uttar Pradesh.  
Uttar Pradesh, as previously discussed, is a special case for the BSP in India.  It won 
control over the state government in 2007 although it has had a significant presence in UP 
prior to the Dalit movements’ “going global.”  In the 1995-1999 period, the BSP had a 
22.67% success rate, much higher than the national average.  By the post-global period, 
however, its success had jumped to an astounding 51.11%.  The case of Uttar Pradesh 
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does show a link between the BSP's success and the BJP's success.  In the pre-global 
period the BJP had about a 42% success rate; by the post-global period its success rate 
had plummeted to only a 14.57% success rate.    
  Table 6: Changes between BSP and BJP in Uttar Pradesh 
 
Since the BSP maintains a shared message with movement since its inception 
from the movement, a connection between the two has been made.  When and if the BSP 
continues to grow and/or present a more moderate message the relationship between the 
party and movement will need to be reexamined.  The movement may very well abandon 
the party if it begins to focus more on political power instead of fighting discrimination 
for Dalits and other low castes.  The plight of Dalits in India will not necessarily 
disappear with the increased political power of the Bahujan Samaj Party.  The Dalit 
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movement will continue, despite the BSP's political success, to urge states to function as 
a protector for citizens (NCDHR.org.in).  As India and the Dalit movement become more 
connected with the global world it is likely that the Dalit cause will continue to mobilize 
and spread its message.   
The rate of “success” for the movement is a difficult conclusion to make.  
Gamson (1990) was considered for his measures of success, but did not prove very 
helpful in the case of the Dalits.  This, in part, is because the movement success in this 
case was determined by the success of a political party and not the only the achievements 
of the social movement organizations.  There are, however, several other problems with 
Gamson’s measures in this case.  For instance, the persistent problems of Dalits in India 
have been formally recognized by a variety of institutions and governments, including the 
United States, the European Union and the United Nations.  Yet, he considers this 
recognition his third indicator for success.     
 One risk to the apparent success of the movement is Smith’s (1999) claim that as 
excluded groups and various movements becomes increasingly visible in a global world 
that there is the risk of a reassertion of traditional values.   The findings of this project 
show that India’s political sphere acts as an open space for both traditional and non-
traditional ideas and politics.  The BSP may be a long ways away from becoming one of 
the major players in Indian politics just as the Dalit movement is not going to end all 
Dalit-based discrimination in the near future, despite its already lengthy past with this 
struggle.   
 Regarding the 15th Lok Sabha elections, Shivam Vij argues that that whatever the 
outcome for the BSP and Mayawati, it will strengthen the Dalit cause.  National Public 
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Radio (April 14th, 2009) quotes Vij as saying,  
The 2009 general elections are not the last general elections for Mayawati. 
They are the first," said Shivam Vij, a journalist and longtime Mayawati 
watcher. "And if she doesn't become prime minister this year she'll say 
'Look, they stopped a Dalit from succeeding.'  
 
More specific future research requires fieldwork in India as a way to gain insight 
into the national mood.  Is Hindu nationalism as relevant to most Indians' lives as some 
scholars think?  Is there a direct and oppositional relationship between Hindu nationalism 
and Dalit rights?  Electoral results do not support this relationship.  Also, a first-hand 
account of the Dalit movement campaigns, transnational participation and local activity 
would aid in determining if this study has any relevance to nationalism, globalization, 
and social movements.   
 This body of preliminary work points to the feasibility of subaltern action to 
challenge hegemonic national identities.  There is a clear path which can be traced 
beginning with the exclusion of the Dalit people from the Indian consciousness.  This 
exclusion was manifested in discriminatory practices which only increased during 
colonial rule.  Rather than being a part of the Indian Hindu identity, the Dalits found 
solidarity and inclusivity first in their own collective identity and then later in the 
transnational social movement network.  This gave them a sub-cultural sense of identity 
for which to then challenge the hegemonic Hindu nationalism.   
 The exclusion of the Dalits remains a central concern for both the movement 
organizations and political parties.  If it were not for this sense of exclusion from the 
Indian nation perhaps neither the movement nor the party would exist.  Although some 
Dalits witness increasing inclusion into the national identity, it is still only achieved 
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through upwards social mobility, the abandonment of Hinduism, or social, cultural, or 
political power.   
 This project initially asked are sub-national social movements which “go global” 
by participating in the transnational social movement network successful at then 
returning to their nation and affecting change in the previously understood national 
identity?  Are they more successful than prior to “going global”?  The hypothesis stated: 
contemporary sub-national social movements are more likely to experience success at 
either challenging their own exclusion or in achieving national inclusivity after 
participating in the transnational social movement network.  While the data presented do 
not incontestably answer the research question and support the hypothesis it demonstrates 
that this is a worthy exploratory case study in need of additional monitoring and research.   
 According to Bahujan Samaj Party results the answer to the research question is 
yes.  Even a 2.12% increase in success is success nonetheless.  Again, this project does 
not, however, argue that this is the only reason the BSP may be experiencing increasing 
success.  There are many other possible routes for the political changes in India.  The 
claim of the National Campaign for Dalit Human Rights of successfully 
internationalizing the Dalit cause should be connected, however to the parallel visibility 
in elections by the BSP. 
 The debate over contemporary nationalism needs to be connected to the vast 
literature on transnationalism, global connections, and social movements.  Even if power 
shifts between the global, the national and the local, there continues to be an emphasis on 
inclusivity.  Who is included and who is not will remain an important question to ask as 
power circulates between, below or beyond the nation.  Scholars will continue to study, 
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debate, disagree and write about the changing nature of nationalism as it is affected by 
global policy, citizenship, and protest.  As top-down approaches continue to determine 
“the hegemonic” of nationalisms and global neoliberal policy, so too will the contention 
from below-whether sub-national, transnational or a reflexive movement between the 
two.   
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      Appendix 1 
    Dalit Social Movement Organizations (SMOs) 
Social Movement 
Organization  
Tactics Slogan Goals Participation in 
Transnational 
Network  
Additional Places 
of Operation  
National 
Campaign on 
Dalit Human 
Rights 
(NCDHR) 
 
Founding Date: 
1998 
 
Founding Place: 
Bangalore 
 
Website: 
Ncdhr.org.in 
 
raise national & 
international 
awareness 
through 
outreach, 
transnational 
networking, 
policy reform 
and various 
other sub-
national 
organizations 
“Dalit Rights 
are Human 
Rights.   
Cast out 
Caste!” 
NCDHR performs atrocity 
monitoring, legal 
interventions, and national 
and international advocacy 
to achieve a three-pronged 
objective: (1) to hold the 
State accountable for all 
Human Rights violations 
committed against Dalits; 
(2) to sensitize civil society 
by raising visibility of the 
Dalit problem; and (3) to 
render justice to Dalit 
victims of discrimination 
and violence. 
Human Rights 
Watch; World 
Social Forum; 
World 
Conference 
against Racism, 
European Union 
and United 
Nations 
14 Indian States: 
Bihar, Delhi, 
Gujarat, Haryana, 
Himachal 
Pradesh, 
Karnataka, 
Kerala, Madhya 
Pradesh, 
Maharashtra, 
Orissa, 
Pondicherry, 
Punjab, Rajasthan, 
Uttar Pradesh.  
Default Location: 
New Hdelhit 
Dalit Freedom 
Network 
 
Founding Date: 
2002 
 
Founding Place:  
Greenwood 
Village, CO, USA 
 
Website:  
Dalitnetwork.org 
Missionary 
work: 
conversion to 
Christianity 
“Abolish Caste, 
Now and 
Forever” 
“religious freedom, social 
justice, and human rights by 
mobilizing human, 
informational, and financial 
resources” 
Christian-based: 
Christian 
Solidarity 
Network; 
IDEAS: 
International 
Development & 
Educational 
Associates; 
International 
Dalit Solidarity 
Network; 
International 
Justice Mission 
Canada, India, 
England, Australia 
International 
Dalit Solidarity 
Network (IDSN) 
 
Founding Date: 
2000 
 
Founding Place: 
Denmark 
 
Website:  
Idsn.org 
work with 
international 
policy-makers, 
UN and EU 
“Working 
globally against 
discrimination 
based on work 
and descent” 
“The International Dalit 
Solidarity Network - IDSN - 
works on a global level for 
the elimination of caste 
discrimination and similar 
forms of discrimination 
based on work and descent.  
We link grassroots priorities 
with international 
mechanisms and institutions 
in order to change policies 
and practices that lead to 
caste discrimination.” 
work primarily 
with various 
organizations 
and policy-
makers inside the 
European Union 
and United 
Nations.  Known 
interaction with 
various branches 
of the Dalit 
movement. 
India, Nepal, 
Pakistan, 
Bangladesh, Sri 
Lanka, Africa 
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     Appendix 1 (Continued) 
 
Social Movement 
Organization  
Tactics Slogan Goals Participation in 
Transnational 
Network  
Additional Places 
of Operation  
Dalit NGO 
Federation-
Nepal 
 
Founding Date: 
1996 
 
Founding Place: 
Kathmandu, 
Nepal 
 
Website: 
Dfnnepal.org 
To eradicate 
caste-based 
discrimination 
through a 
process of 
empowerment, 
networking and 
alliance 
building of 
Dalit and pro-
Dalit 
institutions 
“United mission 
for social 
change.” 
“The main aim of DNF is 
fighting together against 
caste-based discrimination. 
It is a common forum for 
raising collective voices of 
Dalit community for 
claiming rights, dignity and 
opportunity through policy 
influencing, networking and 
alliance building.” 
works with 
smaller 
organizations in 
Nepal and then 
larger 
international 
organizations, 
especially 
throughout Asia.   
serves as an 
umbrella 
organization 
Dalit Solidarity 
 
Founding Date: 
2000 
 
Founding Place:  
Tamil Nadu 
 
Website:  
Dalitsolidarity.org 
work in 
extremely rural 
and poor 
communities.  
Provides access 
to education, 
health care, and 
economic 
opportunities 
“Justice and 
Equality for all 
Indians” 
“Dalit Solidarity is 
committed to the principles 
of justice and equality for all 
Indians, regardless of caste, 
race, gender or religion. 
This commitment is 
expressed by providing 
access to quality health care 
and education, by making 
economic opportunities 
available for India's poorest 
citizens, and by working to 
protect human rights.” 
Exclusively sub-
national.  Works 
with NCDHR 
however. 
Works exclusively 
in Tamil Nadu 
Navsarjan 
 
Founding Date: 
1988 
 
Founding Place:  
Gujarat 
 
Website:  
Narvsarjan.org 
 
training, 
awareness, 
fieldwork and 
legal 
intervention 
“Ensuring 
human rights 
for all.” 
“Our mission is to eliminate 
discrimination based on 
untouchability practices; 
ensure equality of status and 
opportunities for all, 
regardless of caste, class or 
gender; and to ensure the 
rule of law.” 
Works with 
NCDHR, IDSN, 
Dalit Foundation, 
Indian Institute 
on Dalit Studies 
3,000 Indian 
villages 
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 Appendix 2 
 
      State Electoral Data 
 
    Table 7: Andhra Pradesh 
 
State Information:  Electoral Data:  
Statehood: 1956 
  
Population: 76,210,007 
Literacy Rate: 60% 
% Urban: 27.3 
Dalit Movement Presence: yes  
         National Federation of Dalit  
         Land Rights Movement 
Location: Southeast India    
                                                            Findings: 
BJP slightly increases its candidates running for office from the pre-global to post-
global periods whereas the BSP more than tripled its presence from 48 to 160.   
 
The BJP decreases its elected positions from 12 to 2.  The BSP increases its positions 
from 0 to 1.   
 
    
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
State:                    Andhra Pradesh
1999 2004
BJP Contested Seats: 24 27
BJP Wins: 12 2
BSP Contested Seats: 48 160
BSP Wins: 0 1
Winning Party: BJP INC 
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   Appendix 2 (Continued) 
 
          Table 8: Bihar  
State Information:  Electoral Data:  
Statehood: 1936 
  
Population: 82,878,796 
Literacy Rate: 47.53 
% Urban: 15.78 
Dalit Movement Presence: yes 
       National Campaign on Dalit  
       Human Rights  
Location: North India   
                                                            Findings: 
 Both the BJP and BSP maintain high numbers of candidates contesting seats.  The 
BSP remains somewhat unsuccessful because the BJP remains the majority party in 
the state.  The number of contested seats for the BSP has increased from 161 to 212 
while the BJP numbers went from 315 all the way down to 102.  The  BSP won 4 
seats in the 2005 election whereas it only had 2 in 1995.  Although the number of 
contested seats by the BJP has decreased, it has increased its overall success in 
garnering elected positions- from 41 to 55.   
  
     
    
 
 
 
 
State:                   Bihar
1995 2000 2005
BJP Contested Seats: 315 168 102
BJP Wins: 41 67 55
BSP Contested Seats: 161 249 212
BSP Wins: 2 5 4
Winning Party: JD* BJP BJP
*Janata Dal
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Appendix 2 (Continued) 
 
          Table 9: Gujarat 
State Information:  Electoral Data:  
Statehood: 1960 
  
Population: 50,671,017 
Literacy Rate: 69.97% 
% Urban: 37.67 
Dalit Movement Presence: yes  
       NCDHR 
  
Location: West India  
                                                            Findings: 
 Although the BJP has won every election since 1998, two factors are important: 
the INC has almost won during various elections.  Also, the number of BSP 
candidates running has drastically increased since 1998 from only 7 candidates to 
166.   
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
State:                   Gujarat
1998 2002 2007
BJP Contested Seats: 182 182 182
BJP Wins: 117 127 117
BSP Contested Seats: 7 34 166
BSP Wins: 0 0 0
Winning Party: BJP BJP BJP
INC a close second
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Appendix 2 (Continued) 
 
          Table 10: Haryana 
State Information:  Electoral Data:  
Statehood: 1966 
  
Population: 21,144,567 
Literacy Rate: 69.97%  
% Urban: 29 
Dalit Movement Presence: yes 
  
Location: North India 
                                                            Findings: 
Despite the fact that Haryana has a significant Dalit movement presence the BSP 
has not significantly shown improvement.  It has managed to hold one seat since 
2000 and has only slightly increased the number of BSP candidates running for 
office.  Surprisingly, however, is that while the BJP has almost quadrupled the 
number of seats it contests it has gone from 11 elected seats in 1996 to only 2 in 
2005.   
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
State:                   Haryana
1996 2000 2005
BJP Contested Seats: 25 29 90
BJP Wins: 11 6 2
BSP Contested Seats: 67 83 84
BSP Wins: 0 1 1
Winning Party: BJP INC  INC 
  93   
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 2 (Continued) 
 
            Table 11: Himachal Pradesh 
State Information:  Electoral Data:  
Statehood: 1948 
  
Population: 6,077,900 
Literacy Rate: 77.13% 
% Urban: 10 
Dalit Movement Presence: yes 
  
Location:  North India 
                                                            Findings: 
The BSP has not been very successful in HP and yet, by 2007 it has increased it 
presence by both running for more contested seats and winning one of those seats.  
It jumped from 28 potential seats to 67.  The BJP has remained steady with 68 
contested seats, but has slightly increased its number of election positions from 31 
to 41.  HP is an extremely rural state and comprised mostly of agriculture and hill 
communities.    
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
State:                   Himachal Pradesh
1998 2003 2007
BJP Contested Seats: 68 68 68
BJP Wins: 31 16 41
BSP Contested Seats: 28 23 67
BSP Wins: 0 0 1
Winning Party: INC   INC  BJP
  94   
 
 
 
 
 
    Appendix 2 (Continued) 
 
           Table 12: Jammu & Kashmir 
State Information:  Electoral Data:  
Statehood: 1846 
  
Population: 10,069.987 
Literacy Rate: 48.22% 
% Urban: 23.33 
Dalit Movement Presence: no  
       known presence 
  
Location:  northernmost tip 
                                                            Findings: 
Neither the BJP nor the BSP have been very successful in J&K, but instead its 
political landscape has been dominated by the Jammu & Kashmir National 
Conference (JKN) party.  Despite the majority rule of the JKN, the BJP and BSP 
have both expanded their presence in the elections.    The BSP presence went from 
29 to 83 regarding the number of seats it ran for; it however, had 4 elected 
positions in 1996 and did not win any in the 2008 election.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
State:                   Jammu & Kashmir
1996 2002 2008
BJP Contested Seats: 53 58 64
BJP Wins: 8 1 11
BSP Contested Seats: 29 33 83
BSP Wins: 4 1 0
Winning Party: JKN* JKN JKN
*Jammu & Kashmir National Conference
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    Appendix 2 (Continued) 
 
               Table 13: Karnataka 
State Information:  Electoral Data:  
Statehood: 1956 (boundary)       
       1972 (current name) 
  
Population: 52,850,562 
Literacy Rate: 66.6% 
% Urban: 33.98 
Dalit Movement Presence: yes 
        NCDHR 
Location: Southwest India 
                                                            Findings: 
Although the BSP and BJP contest a high number of seats, the Indian National 
Congress (INC) party has remained strong.     The seats contested by the BJP 
jumped from 149 in the pre-global period to 198 in the post-global period.  It also 
gained an additional 35 seats from the 44 it had in 1999.  The BSP has not had any 
candidates elected although it slightly increased its presence from 85 to 102.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
State:                   Karnataka
1999 2004
BJP Contested Seats: 149 198
BJP Wins: 44 79
BSP Contested Seats: 85 102
BSP Wins: 0 0
Winning Party: INC   INC 
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    Appendix 2 (Continued) 
 
            Table 14: Kerala  
State Information:  Electoral Data:  
Statehood: 1956 
  
Population: 31,841,274 
Literacy Rate: 90.92%* 
% Urban: 26 
Dalit Movement Presence: yes 
  
Location: southwest tip 
                                                            Findings: 
 Politcally, Kerala is most often associated with the Communist Party of India, 
both Marxist and not.  Despite this majority, the INC gained power in 2001 only 
to loose it in 2006.  The BSP has increased its presence while not winning any 
positions.  Likewise, the BJP has not won any positions, but also slightly 
increased its presence in the state.   
*High literacy rate is thought to be associated with the high Christian population (at 19%) and a 
history of missionary work promoting education.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
State:                   Kerala
1996 2001 2006
BJP Contested Seats: 127 123 136
BJP Wins: 0 0 0
BSP Contested Seats: 12 0 107
BSP Wins: 0 0 0
Winning Party: CPI INC  CPM
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    Appendix 2 (Continued) 
 
            Table 15: Madhya Pradesh 
State Information:  Electoral Data:  
Statehood: 1956 
  
Population: 60,385,118 
Literacy Rate: 64.1%  
% Urban: 17 
Dalit Movement Presence: yes  
        NCDHR 
Location: central India 
                                                            Findings: 
 The BSP has had a relatively strong presence in MP, although it has not overcome 
the BJP in the elections by any means.  BSP presence in the post-global period has 
grown from 170 to 228; it has, however, maintained 11 seats between the pre- and 
post- period.  The contested seats by the BJP have decreased from 320 to 228, but 
their elected positions have grown from 119 to 143.   
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
State:                   Madhya Pradesh
1998 2003 2008
BJP Contested Seats: 320 230 228
BJP Wins: 119 173 143
BSP Contested Seats: 170 157 228
BSP Wins: 11 2 11
Winning Party: INC   BJP BJP
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    Appendix 2 (Continued) 
 
                 Table 16: Maharashtra 
State Information:  Electoral Data:  
Statehood: 1960 
  
Population: 96,752,247 
Literacy Rate: 76.9% 
% Urban: 42.4 
Dalit Movement Presence: yes 
        NCDHR 
Location: West India 
                                                            Findings: 
  Despite the BSP's lack of elected officials, it has more than tripled its presence in 
elections between 1999 and 2004 from 83 to 272. BJP numbers are relatively 
static, only decreasing by 2 elected seats and 6 contested seats.     
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
State:                   Maharashtra
1999 2004
BJP Contested Seats: 117 111
BJP Wins: 56 54
BSP Contested Seats: 83 272
BSP Wins: 0 0
Winning Party: BJP INC 
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    Appendix 2 (Continued) 
 
            Table 17: Orissa 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
State Information:  Electoral Data:  
Statehood: 1949  
 
Population: 36,804,660 
Literacy Rate: 63.61% 
% Urban: 14.97 
Dalit Movement Presence: yes 
  
Location: east coast of India 
                                                            Findings: 
 There have been no major changes in the BSP in Orissa; it has not been elected to 
any positions and grew marginally from 59 to 86 contested seats.  The BJP, 
however, has won more seats in the past two elections, 2000 and 2004, winning 38 
seats and 32 seats.  And yet, it has not contested as many seats as was seen in the 
1995 election, falling to 63 from 144.     
 
State:                   Orissa
1995 2000 2004
BJP Contested Seats: 144 63 63
BJP Wins: 9 38 32
BSP Contested Seats: 59 105 86
BSP Wins: 0 0 0
Winning Party: INC   BJP BJP
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    Appendix 2 (Continued) 
 
            Table 18: Punjab 
State Information:  Electoral Data:  
Statehood: 1937 
  
Population: 24,358,999 
Literacy Rate: 60% 
% Urban: 33.92 
Dalit Movement Presence: yes 
        NCDHR 
Location: northwest tip 
                                                            Findings: 
 The Dalit movement has had a lengthy history of activism in Punjab.  And yet, the 
BJP continues to maintain a majority in the 2007 elections.  It has steadily held 
about 18-19 seats although it lost to the INC in the 2002 election, dropping its 
seats to a mere 3.   
 
The BSP has jumped from 67 to 115 contested seats but lost its one seat in the 
1997 election by 2002 and did not gain any additional seats in the 2007 election.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
State:                   Punjab
1997 2002 2007
BJP Contested Seats: 22 23 23
BJP Wins: 18 3 19
BSP Contested Seats: 67 100 115
BSP Wins: 1 0 0
Winning Party: BJP INC  BJP
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    Appendix 2 (Continued) 
 
      Table 19: Rajasthan 
State Information:  Electoral Data:  
Statehood: 1956 
  
Population: 56,473,122 
Literacy Rate: 61.03% 
% Urban: 23.4 
Dalit Movement Presence: yes  
        NCDHR 
Location: west India 
                                                            Findings: 
The BSP has slightly increased both its number of candidates running and how 
many gain a seat.  In 1998 it won 2 of the 108 seats it ran for whereas in 2008 it 
won 6 of the 199 contested seats.  The BJP's elected positions have grown 
considerably from 33 to 78.  The number of seats BJP candidates have run for has 
remained somewhat static.    
 
   
 
   
 
 
 
State:                   Rajasthan
1998 2003 2008
BJP Contested Seats: 196 197 193
BJP Wins: 33 120 78
BSP Contested Seats: 108 124 199
BSP Wins: 2 2 6
Winning Party: INC   BJP INC 
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    Appendix 2 (Continued) 
 
            Table 20: Tamil Nadu 
State Information:  Electoral Data:  
Statehood: 1969 
  
Population: 62,405,679 
Literacy Rate: 73.5% 
% Urban: 44.1 
Dalit Movement Presence: yes 
  
Location: southeast tip 
                                                            Findings: 
The BSP has drastically increased its candidates contesting seats in elections, from 
9 in 1996 to 17 in 2001 to 164 in 2006.  It did not win any of those seats.  The BJP 
increased the number of seats it ran for as well-from 143 to 225.  As of 2006, 
however, it did not gain any positions in government.  The leading party is 
typically the Communist Party of India or the Communist Party (Marxist) although 
the INC won in the 2006 election.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
State:                   Tamil Nadu
1996 2001 2006
BJP Contested Seats: 143 21 225
BJP Wins: 1 4 0
BSP Contested Seats: 9 17 164
BSP Wins: 0 0 0
Winning Party: CPI CPM INC 
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    Appendix 2 (Continued) 
 
            Table 21: West Bengal     
State Information:  Electoral Data:  
Statehood: 1950 
  
Population: 80,176,197 
Literacy Rate: 69.22% 
% Urban: 28 
Dalit Movement Presence: no 
        known presence 
Location: northeast India 
                                                            Findings: 
Politically, West Bengal has historically been dominated by the Communist Party 
of India- Marxist (CPM).  The BSP has, however, increased its presence on the 
polls. In 1996 it only ran for 48 seats whereas it ran for 128 in 2006.  Despite this 
growth the BSP has not been elected to any positions.  The BJP has not held any 
elected positions in the electoral years under review here.  Its number of 
candidates has significantly decreased from 292 in 1996 to only 29 in 2006.   
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
State:                   West Bengal
1996 2001 2006
BJP Contested Seats: 292 266 29
BJP Wins: 0 0 0
BSP Contested Seats: 48 38 128
BSP Wins: 0 0 0
Winning Party: CPM CPM CPM
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